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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Daniel Ehrlick appeals from his judgment of conviction entered upon a jury finding him 
guilty of first degree murder and failure to report a death to law enforcement. He asserts that in 
light of the numerous erroneous evidentiary rulings, the prejudicial nature of the evidence 
erroneously admitted, the misconduct committed by the prosecutor, and the highly circumstantial 
nature of the evidence against him, the errors either individually or cumulative deprived him of 
his right to a fair trial and this Court must vacate his convictions. 1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On the night of July 241\ 2009, Daniel Ehrlick started searching the Oak Park Village 
Apartment complex (hereinafter, complex) for R.M., the 8-year-old son of his live-in girlfriend, 
Melissa Jenkins, and at 10: 11 p.m., Mr. Ehrlick called 911. (Tr., p.3331, L.4 p.3344, L. 13.)2 
Mr. Ehrlick reported that he had been searching for R.M. since around 7 p.m., and that he was 
supposed to be at a birthday party, but he was missing. Id The complex is located in the middle 
of a residential area in Boise near Vista A venue, is comprised of multiple apartment buildings 
and condos surrounding a swimming pool, playground areas, and a duck pond, and is located a 
few blocks from the New York Canal. (Ex., p.55 (diagram of the complex); Tr., p.3144, L.24 -
p.3151, L.9 (testimony of security guard, Chris Phillips); Ex. p.56 (aerial photo of the complex); 
Ex., p.57 (aerial photo of the complex and the surrounding area including Vista Ave., and the 
1 Although Mr. Ehrlick's claims relate specifically to his murder conviction, as no evidence was presented to support 
a conclusion that Mr. Ehrlick could have failed to inform law enforcement about R.M. 's death without also being the 
person who caused his death, Mr. Ehrlick asserts that should this court vacate his murder conviction, it should also 
vacate his conviction for failure to report a death. 
2 For ease of reference, the two large volumes of transcripts prepared in this case will be cited as "Tr." while 
citations to all other transcripts will also include the date of the proceedings transcribed. 
1 
New York Canal).)3 Police officers arrived at the complex and, with the help of neighbors and 
community members, a massive search began that lasted in various forms for the next nine days. 
(See generally, Transcripts. )4 
Mr. Ehrlick told multiple people during the next 24 hours that prior to disappearing, R.M. 
had repeatedly asked if he could go to a birthday paiiy, Mr. Ehrlick told him that he could not, 
and R.M. went to the complex playground. (See Tr., p.2539, L.7 p.2540, L.6 (Mr. Ehrlick's 
brother, David); Tr., p.3144, L.24 - p.3162, L.5 (Chris Phillips, complex security guard); Tr., 
p.3357, L.3 - p.3369, L.20 (Officer Guy McKean); Tr., p.3423, L.17 p.3429, L.9 (Officer Paul 
Jagosh); Tr., p.3473, L. 10 p.3484, L.25 (Callie Lawryn, neighbor); Tr., p.3490, L.12 p.3498, 
L.20 (Samantha Burnett, neighbor); Tr., p.3524, L.6 - p.3541, L.13 (Officer Cory Barnmert,); 
Tr., p.3565, L.22 p.3588, L.23, p.3597, L.11 - p.3598, L.3 (Officer Adam Schloegel); Tr., 
p.3742, L.4 - p.3757, L.11 (Det. Glen Rawson); Tr., p.3928, L.2 p.3943, L. 15 (Det. Brett 
Quilter); Tr., p.4317, L.2 p.4329, L.3 (Cora Maucher, neighbor).) 
By the next day, law enforcement began investigating R.M. 's family members and close 
friends, in addition to continuing the search. (Tr., p.3986, L.17 - p.3987, L.14 (Det. Quilter).) 
They discovered that R.M. lived in New Plymouth with his father and step-mother, Charles and 
Afton Manwill, during the school year but that he stayed with Ms. Jenkins and Mr. Ehrlick at the 
complex during the summer. (Tr., p.5233, L.1 p.5387, L.17 (Afton and Charles Manwill).) 
Investigators brought Watson, a dog trained both as a cadaver and a live-find dog, through the 
apartment but Watson did not find any scent. (Tr., p.4093, L.13 p.4104, L.1.) Watson and 
3 Citations to paper exhibits included in the electronic file "39249 State v. Ehrlick Exhibits" will include the 
designation "Ex." followed by the page number of the electronic file. Citations to other exhibits not included in the 
electronic file will include their exhibit number. 
4 A multitude of witnesses testified that they in some way participated in either the search for R.M., the investigation 
surrounding his disappearance, or both. Captain Eugene Smith of the Boise Police Department testified about the 
search in general, including the involvement of the media and participation of multiple law enforcement agencies 
and community members. (Tr., p.4075, L. 10 p.4092, L.24.) In the interest of brevity, Mr. Ehrlick will not cite to 
the specific testimony of witnesses involved unless that testimony is relevant to an issue raised in this Brief. 
2 
other search dogs were also taken around the complex and up to the canal two blocks away but 
did not discover anything. 5 (Tr., p.4104, L.20 - p.4105, p.17.) 
Mr. Ehrlick repeatedly agreed to speak with law enforcement, he continually denied 
being involved with or having any information about R.M. 's disappearance, and he continually 
told investigators that R.M. had asked him to go to a birthday party, Mr. Ehrlick would not allow 
him to go, and R.M. disappeared after returning to the pool area / playground of the complex. 
(See generally, Ex., pp.68-69 (transcript of Mr. Ehrlick's call to 911); Ex., pp.73-110 (Officer 
Schloegel' s audio recorded July 24, 2009 at the complex); Ex., pp.131-168 (Mr. Ehr lick' s 
interview with detectives on July 25, 2009); Ex., pp.170-224 (Mr. Ehrlick and Ms. Jenkins' 
interview with law enforcement on July 26, 2009); Ex. pp.238-467 (Mr. Ehrlick's interviews 
with law enforcement on July 30, 2009); Ex., pp.474-529 (Mr. Ehrlick's interview with law 
enforcement on August 9, 2009).) 
Melissa Jenkins was already known to investigators because of her prior abuse of her 
infant son, A.J., which resulted in a skull fracture and A.J. being taken away from her. 
(Tr., p.3075, L.17 - p.3076, L.8, p.3111, L. l - p.3120, L.16 (Det. Bill).) As a result, Ms. Jenkins 
was placed on probation and required to take certain classes while Mr. Ehrlick voluntarily agreed 
to take the same classes and he was eventually awarded custody of A.J. (See generally 
5 Prior to R.M.'s body being discovered in the New York Canal, a different scent-dog, Maddy, tracked R.M.'s scent 
starting at the comer of Five Mile and Lockwood roads and into a corn field where she lost his scent, and again from 
the same starting point to a parked vehicle (that had previously been reported as stolen but had been returned), and 
then to the front door of the residence belonging to Evan Wallis and Jennifer Whitman. (PSI, pp.478-481.) 
Ms. Moser and her cadaver-dog Watson went to the property the next day and Watson indicated on an area of fresh 
digging in the back yard; however, R.M. was not found on the property. Id. Mr. Wallis told the police that he and 
Ms. Whitman are good friends with David Ehrlick (Mr. Ehrlick's brother) and Daniel Ehrlick Sr. (Mr. Ehrlick's 
father), that he knows Mr. Ehrlick, Ms. Jenkins and R.M, that R.M. has never been to his property, and that David 
Ehrlick visits his house a lot and often borrows the vehicle that was stolen and R.M.'s scent was tracked to. Id 
Mr. Wallis, Ms. Whitman and their children used his mother's car and drove to Utah for a family reunion on the 
25th, and returned on the 26t11. Id. David Ehrlick was at the Wallis residence, which is located upstream from where 
R.M. was found, on the night of July 24, 2009. (See Ex., p.58 (aerial map highlighting the New York Canal and 
designating the complex and the location R.M.'s body was found); see also, Tr., p.2532, L. 18 - p.2537, L.5 (David 
Ehrlick testifying about his whereabouts on July 24th prior to Mr. Ehrlick calling and saying that R.M. was 
missing).) Other than David Ehrlick's testimony about his whereabouts, this evidence was not presented at trial. 
3 
(Tr.5/26/11, p.19, L.1 - p.68, L.14 (Heidi Quijas, Health and Welfare); Tr.5/26/11, p.69, L.4-
p.116, L.7 (Laura Bessey, Health and Welfare); Tr.5/26/11, p.117, L.1 - p.153, L.25 (Amy 
Pomeroy, counselor with AmeriPsych); Tr.5/26/11, p.155, L. 1 - p.168, L.13 (Ashley Polhemus, 
Ada County Misdemeanor Probation Services); Tr.5/27/11, p.171, L.14 - p.233, L.17 (Erica 
Moe, counselor with Family Connections); Tr.5/27/11, p.234, L. 10 - p.265, L.16 (Brittany 
Journee, counselor with SANE Solutions); Tr.5/27/11, p.266, L.7 - p.344, L.23 (Angela Hudson, 
counselor with Family Connections); Tr., p.2703, L.12 - p.2717, L.24 (Claudia Currie-Mills, 
counselor with SANE Solutions).) The social workers who saw Mr. Ehrlick interact with A.J. 
saw a loving and appropriately bonded relationship between the two, and saw that Mr. Ehrlick 
was motivated to successfully complete the programs he voluntarily participated in. (Tr.5/26/11, 
p.32, L.21 p.43, L.6 (Quijas); Tr.5/26/11, p.73, L.15 -p.76, L.19 (Bessey); Tr.5/26/11, p.124, 
L.1 p.133, L.17 (Pomeroy); Tr.5/27/11, p.184, L.22 p.185, L.2 (Moe); Tr.5/27/11, p.280, 
L.21 p.281, L.4 (Hudson)). While some of these social workers described Mr. Ehrlick' s 
relationship with R.M. as being "distant", Mr. Ehrlick specifically asked about learning 
techniques to grow a stronger bond with R.M. (Tr.5/26/11, p.152, Ls.6-10 (Amy Pomeroy); 
Tr.5/27/11, p.184, L.15 p.207, L.10 (Erica Moe); Tr.5/27/11, p.281, Ls.5-25) (Angela 
Hudson).) 
However, R.M. was not present during some of the occasions in which social workers 
were providing services to the family. (See Ex., pp. I 000-1001.) One week before R.M. went 
missing, Ms. Jenkins told Angela Hudson that R.M. was living with his father and step-mother in 
New Plymouth as punishment for striking a horse with a board. (Tr.5/27/11, p.317, L.23 p.319, 
L.19.) In reality, Ms. Jenkins and Mr. Ehrlick had hidden R.M. from social workers due to R.M. 
having bruises on his back. (See Ex., pp.413-416, 423-428, 439, 447-449 (interview of 
Mr. Ehrlick by investigators conducted July 30, 2009); Ex., pp.488-490 (interview of Mr. Ehrlick 
4 
by investigators conducted August 9, 2009.) 
Mr. Ehr lick told investigators that R.M. 's bruises resulted from a procedure he called 
"dead-bugging," where R.M. would be required to lay on his back for 8 minutes (1 minute per 
year of his age) with his arms and legs in the air, when he misbehaved. (Ex., pp.423-428, 439; 
Ex., pp.488-490.) Mr. Ehrlick further told investigators that it was Ms. Jenkins' idea to hide 
R.M. from social workers and that he was not even at the apartment when many of these visits 
occurred. (Ex., pp.447-449; Ex., pp.481, 488-490.) R.M. was hidden from Angela Hudson when 
she conducted her last visit on the morning of July 24, 2009. (Tr.5/27111, p.321, L.22 - p.322, 
L. 1; Ex., pp.503-506; Ex., pp. I 000-1001.) Mr. Ehrlick admitted that he and Ms. Jenkins had 
used additional forms of punishment on R.M., including requiring him the kneel next to wall 
with his nose against the wall, requiring him to sit on his hands during time-outs, 6 twice hitting 
his buttocks with a stick, sending him to his room, and feeding him oatmeal and raisins (food 
R.M. did not like) in lieu of other food that R.M. was given, but of which he complained. 
(Ex., pp.415, 439-442; Ex., pp.491-493.) Although not punishment, Mr. Ehrlick also stated that 
R.M. had occasionally slept in a "day bed," which was a crib with one of the sides removed. (Tr., 
p.1715, L.20 p.1718, L.21; Ex., pp.687-688 (Det. Ayotte; photos of the day bed/crib).) 
Mr. Ehrlick also admitted to investigators that he put both knees on Robert once while he was 
"dead-bugging," about two weeks prior to his disappearing, in order to keep him from moving. 
(Ex., pp.505-507.) 
6 Mr. Ehrlick referred to this form of punishment as "the chair." (Ex., p.492; Tr., p.5916, Ls.1-10). The State 
entered as an exhibit a photo of a woman leaning against a wall in a seated position, without a chair, and asserted 
that this was the punishment known as "the chair" purportedly according to Mr. Ehrlick and other unnamed 
"sources." (Tr., p.1720, Ls.4-7; Ex., p.684.) Mr. Ehrlick did not describe the "the chair" in the way depicted by the 
photo and no other "sources" testified that the photo was an accurate depiction of "the chair." However, witnesses 
did describe R.M. as being forced to sit on his hands on a couch or a chair as punishment. (Tr., p.2510, L.21 -
p.2511, L.4 (David Ehrlick describing R.M. as being forced to sit on his hands on a chair for a half hour as 
punishment); p.4643, L.23 - p.4644, L.7 (Daniel Ehrlick, Sr., Mr. Ehrlick's father, describing R.M. as being forced 
to sit on his hands on either a chair or a sofa as punishment).) 
5 
During one of these interrogations, investigators told Mr. Ehrlick that Ms. Jenkins told 
them that R.M. had an ankle injury and was limping on the 24th, a claim that Mr. Ehrlick denied. 
(Ex., pp.417-418.) However, the district court admonished the jury that they could not consider 
statements made by the investigators, including statements which allegedly came from 
Ms. Jenkins, and statements about their ability to determine Mr. Ehrlick's truthfulness by their 
observations of him, for the truth of the matter asserted. (Tr., p.1650, L.22 -p.1651, L.4.) 
Investigators searched the Ehrlick/Jenkins apartment on July 30th and located a hole in a 
portion of a wall in the hallway of the apartment, covered by paper, and they cut and removed 
that portion of the wall from the apartment. 7 (Tr., p.1745, L.20 -p.1751, L.2, p.1796, L.11 -
p.1798, L.22.) When law enforcement interrogated Mr. Ehrlick suggesting that he caused the 
hole by slamming R.M.'s head into the wall, after first stating R.M.'s head was larger than his, 
Mr. Ehrlick told investigators that he slipped while trying to answer his phone and hit the wall 
with his knee. (Ex., pp.424-431, 445; Ex., pp.517-521) Mitochondrial DNA testing of two body 
hairs removed from the hole were consistent with having come from Mr. Ehrlick's maternal line 
but R.M. was excluded as the source of the hair. (Tr., p.1836, L.22-p.1837, L.16, p.1878, L.24 
- p.1880, L.5 (William Schneck, testifying that he removed the hairs from the wall); Tr., p.5827, 
L.7 - p.5828, L.11, p.5849, L.15 - p.5854, L.24 (Dr. Greg Hampikian, testifying about the 
results of the DNA testing on the hairs).) 
On August 3, 2009, R.M.'s body was discovered floating with the current on the surface 
of the New York Canal near Kuna, Idaho, and was recovered. (Tr., p.1328, L.12 - p.1346, L.9 
(Donna Pettit); Tr., p.1347, L.1 - p.1361, L.9 (Robert Heath); Tr., p.1362, L.1 - p.1386, L.2 
(Dep. Justin Elliot); Tr., p.1388, L.3 -p.1395, L.10 (Dr. Curtis Guiles, DDS).) 
7 The FBI eventually made a 3-dimentional model of the portion of the wall containing the hole, which was entered 
into evidence as Exhibit 26-B. (Tr., p.2758, L.14 - p.2796, L.6 (testimony of Robert Thomas).) 
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Dr. Groben conducted the autopsy and found two possible causes of death - a 
deceleration impact injury causing a two inch contusion (with no associated skull fracture) to the 
back of R.M.'s head, and a blunt force trauma injury to his abdomen - and he determined that 
the manner of death was homicide. (Tr., p.1508, L.9 - p.1625, L.7 (Dr. Groben's complete 
testimony).) He opined that the condition ofR.M.'s body was consistent with having been put in 
the canal on or around July 241\ but he could not say that his body was definitely put in the water 
on that day. (Tr., p.1536, Ls.3-16; Tr., p.1607, L.24 - p.1608, L.3.) Dr. Groben testified that 
although he could not opine whether the head injury would be immediately fatal, death would 
have occurred within hours of the injury, and that a person suffering such an injury would likely 
be lethargic, nauseous and vomiting. (Tr., p.1541, L.9 -p.1557, L.10.) He also noticed evidence 
of an older injury to the brain. (T., p.1551, L.18 - p.1553, L.2.) 
Dr. Groben testified that the injury to the abdomen was a compressive injury caused by a 
sudden force and R.M. would have died between 6 and 12 hours after sustaining the injury. 
(Tr., p.1557, L. 10 - p.1579, L.14, p.1617, Ls.6-17.) Dr. Groben could not say the only possible 
cause of the injuries was Mr. Ehrlick dropping knees onto R.M. while he lay on his back. (Tr., 
p.1579, Ls.6-14.; Tr., p.1615, L.15 - p.1616, L.21.) Dr. Groben also noticed evidence of an 
older abdominal injury. (Tr.,p.1568, L.12 - p.1569, L.14.) He found no broken or cracked 
bones and no bruises on R.M.' s back; however, a bruise was found under the surface of R.M. 's 
right buttock, and recent bruises on his left forearm and above his elbow (Tr., p.1537, Ls.8-10, 
p.1569, Ls.15-22, p.1581, L.9 - p.1589, L.4.) R.M. stomach contents consisted of oatmeal and 
raisins. (Tr., p.1836, L.22 - p.1861, L.23 (William Schneck).) 
An Ada County grand jury issued an Indictment charging Mr. Ehrlick with one count of 
first degree murder, alleged to have been committed either by torture, or by aggravated battery of 
7 
a child under 12, and with one count of failure to report a death to law enforcement. 8 (R., pp.24-
26.) Ms. Jenkins was also indicted by the same grandjury.9 (R., pp.28-29, 57-58, 302.) 
The State sought to prove that R.M. was never outside playing on the 24th by presenting 
the testimony of several witnesses who were at the pool area throughout the afternoon and 
evening who did not see R.M. (Tr., p.3153, L.22-p.3161, L.9 (Chris Phillips); Tr., p.3236, L.5 -
p.3245, L.18 (David Brechbiel, visitor); Tr., p.3263, L.14 - p.3271, L.8 (Julie Sterr, neighbor)); 
Tr., p.3490, L.12 - p.3495, L.22 (Samantha Burnett, neighbor); Tr., p.3631, L.23 - p.3637, L.24 
(Pamela Duncan, neighbor); Tr., p.4317, L.2 - p.4323, L.4 (Cora Maucher, neighbor); Tr., 
p.4963, L.5 - p.4969, L. 10 (Whitney Bright, neighbor); Tr., p.4977, L.22 - p.4983, L.25 (Gloria 
DeKelley, neighbor); Tr., p.4992, L.16-p.4997, L.23 (Elvira Djokic, neighbor); Tr., p.5006, L.8 
- p.5013, L.14 (Amanda Hanscom, babysitter).) 
Presumably aware that the defense was planning on presenting the testimony of witnesses 
who told investigators they did see R.M. alive and well on July 24th, over defense objection, the 
State was allowed to present the testimony of FBI Agent Mary Martin, who opined that none of 
the witnesses who claimed to have seen R.M. on the 24th were credible. (Tr., p.4434, L.4 -
p.4460, L.16.) The defense did, in fact, present the testimony of three witnesses who said that 
they saw R.M. alive and well on July 24th. (Tr., p.5700, L.3 - p.5713, L.6 (O.J. 10 testifying that 
he spoke with R.M. in the early afternoon); Tr., p.5679, L.21 - p.5693, L.23 (M.R. testifying that 
she saw R.M. playing in the pool area); p.5739, L.7 - p.5751, L.l (Jennifer Hastings testifying 
8 The Indictment was later amended to change some of the language, but not the charges themselves, and the State 
also filed an Information Part II alleging that Mr. Ehrlick was a persistent violator. (R., pp.319-320, 632-634.) 
9 Ms. Jenkins ultimately pied guilty to aiding and abetting in R.M.'s murder and, according to defense counsel who 
stated that he read the transcript of the hearing, Ms. Jenkins "just agrees, basically, that the state had enough 
evidence, in her opinion, to convict her codefendant, and she didn't protect the child, and she had some reason to 
think the child was at risk." (Tr., p.4577, Ls.20-25.) Ms. Jenkins did not testify in Mr. Ehrlick's trial. 
10 The court reporter spelled this young man's first name as starting with the letter "O". However, according to 
State's exhibit 75-8 (Ex., p.1106), which contains a school photo, his name, and his address, O.J.'s first name is 
actually spelled with an "A." For ease of reference and in order to eliminate confusion with R.M.'s little brother 
who is known as "A.J.," this witness will be describes as "O.J." in this Brief. 
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that she saw R.M. at the pool area).) 11 
The State further presented the testimony of people who lived in the apartment complex 
and claimed they did not find any signs of a birthday party. (Tr., p.2481, L.23 - p.2482, L. 7 
(Shane Maberry); Tr., p.3161, L.20 - p.3165, L.5 (Chris Phillips); p.3498, Ls.10-22 (Samantha 
Burnett); Tr., p.3645, Ls.10-13 (Pamela Duncan); Tr., p.4969, L.21 - p.4970, L.1 (Whitney 
Bright); Tr., p.4985, Ls.4-15 (Gloria DeKelley).) Over defense counsel's objection, Samantha 
Burnett was allowed to testify that, in her opinion, the birthday party story did not make sense to 
her. (Tr., p.3500, L.13 p.3506, L.20.) 
However, Julie Sterr testified that she, her four children, her boyfriend David Brechbiel, 
and his two children, celebrated two of their children's birthdays with cupcakes in Ms. Sterr's 
apartment, D-201, after the pool closed around 10 p.m. on the 24th . (Tr., p.3263, L.14 - p.3272, 
L. 13.) Ms. Sterr testified that although no other children from the complex were invited (Tr., 
p.3 272, Ls.14-17), there may have been discussion about a bi1ihday party while they were at the 
pool sometime between 8:30 and 10 p.m., because they all knew they were going to have 
cupcakes to celebrate the birthdays, and her 9 year-old has "learning delays" and to him "a 
birthday is a birthday, and that's a party, whether it has little kids non-related or not." (Tr., 
p.3282, L.18 - p.3283, L.1, p.3292, Ls.9-24.) While Ms. Sterr and Mr. Brechbeil did not 
consider it to be a "party" (id; see also Tr., p.3236, L.5 - p.3262, L.24 (David Brechbiel)), K.D. 
and T.D, whom Ms. Sterr remembers being at the pool (Tr., p.3279, L.24-p.3281, L.25) relayed 
to adults that they had heard about the birthday party (Tr., p.3296, L.3 - p.3297, L.22 (Chris 
Phillips testifying that he heard K.D. and T.D. tell Mr. Ehrlick about a birthday party in one of 
the buildings and Mr. Ehrlick and Ms. Jenkins went to the apartment in question); (Det. Quilter 
11 Additionally, Daniel Ehrlick, Sr., originally believed that he saw R.M. on the playground around 7 p.m. on the 
24th when he visited Mr. Ehrlick, but he later believed that he was mistaken and testified that he did not see him that 
day. (Tr., p.4675, L.13 - p.4680, L.20.) 
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testifying that Mr. Ehrlick introduced him to K.D. and T.D. who could tell him the location of 
the apartment in the D building where they believed the birthday party was to take place)). 
Furthermore, Amanda Hanscom testified that she was watching some kids at the complex pool 
on the night of the 24th and heard two adults in the hot tub talking about cancelling a birthday 
party while K.D., T.D., and other kids (but not R.M.) were in the hot tub with them. (Tr., p.5006, 
L.8 -p.5019, L.14.) 
Pursuant to the district court granting their 404(b) motion over defense counsel's 
continued objections (S.R. 12, pp.212-240, 348-367, pp.398-411, pp.968-974; R., p.837), the State 
presented the testimony of three women, each of whom had a prior dating relationship with 
Mr. Ehrlick, who each claimed that he was physically abusive to them and that he somehow 
seemed to enjoy doing so. (Tr., p.2809, L.8 - p.2833, L.9 (Misty Barnett testifying that she was 
in an abusive relationship with Mr. Ehrlick approximately 20 years prior, and that he must have 
enjoyed abusing her because he had "an evil look on his face"); Tr., p.2834, L.4 p.2868, L.19 
(Kelly Marshall testifying that she was involved in a physically abusive relationship with 
Mr. Ehr lick in 1997, and that she believed he took pleasure in causing her pain because he never 
apologized or showed remorse); Tr., p.2869, L.11 -p.2899, L.3 (Alexis Palmer who testified that 
she was in a physically abusive relationship with Mr. Ehrlick in 2004 and that she believed he 
liked "being mean" because he would not apologize and would "smirk").) The State further 
called Dr. Allen Keller, the founder and director of a program for survivors of torture, who 
provided the jury with his own, non-legal definition of torture, and then testified that in addition 
to causing physical pain, things such as intimidation, isolation, providing food a person does not 
want to eat, providing a choice of punishment, and taking advantage of a person's weaknesses or 
fears are all forms of torture. (Tr., p.5076, L.23 -p.5161, L.24.) 
12 The electronic Sealed Record shall be cited as "S.R." 
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The State presented evidence, pursuant to the court granting their pre-trial motion over 
defense objection (S.R., pp.182-196, 360-361, 409), that Mr. Ehrlick allegedly attempted to alter 
and/or influence Ms. Jenkins' testimony. (Tr., p.4228, L.14 - p.4232, L.18 (Det. Mark Ayotte 
testifying that he was aware that on June 28, 2010, Mr. Ehrlick called Robbyn Ehrlick asking her 
to contact Ms. Jenkins, and the court informing the jury that the State filed a motion to compel 
Ms. Jenkins' testimony on June 14, 2010); Ex., pp.469-472 (transcript of voicemail left on 
Ms. Jenkins' phone by Mr. Ehrlick on July 30, 2009); Ex., pp.1200-1201 (summary of 
Mr. Ehrlick's whereabouts and activities on July 30, 2009, including a summary of his contacts 
with Ms. Jenkins); Tr., p.2637, L.7 - p.2646, L.l (testimony of Robbyn Ehrlick stating 
Mr. Ehrlick called her and asked her to get a letter to Ms. Jenkins; Ex. 48A) (audio recording of 
conversation between Mr. Ehrlick and Robbyn Ehrlick); Ex., pp.780-782 (letter from Mr. Ehrlick 
addressed to Robbyn Ehrlick, and an included letter from Mr. Ehrlick addressed to Ms. Jenkins).) 
Additionally, pursuant to the court granting its pre-trial motion over defense objection, 
and in spite of Mr. Ehrlick's claim that he neither attempted to commit suicide nor faked a 
suicide attempt, and that such evidence violated his 5th Amendment rights (S.R., pp.412-423; R., 
p.809; Tr., p.439, L.13 - p.442, L.19), the State presented evidence that Mr. Ehrlick purportedly 
faked a suicide attempt. Trish Burrell, Ms. Jenkins, sister testified that Mr. Ehrlick stayed at her 
house on July 30th and slept outside, he was groggy in the morning and did not want to wake up, 
she found an empty bottle of Lorazepam and suspected he took an overdose, and she drove him 
to the police station. (Tr., p.5603, L.14 - p.5605, L.5, p.5614, L.6 - p.5617, L. 13.) Hospital 
officials testified that he treated Mr. Ehrlick in the emergency room, that his condition was not 
consistent with a drug overdose, that Mr. Ehrlick repeatedly stated he did not try and kill himself, 
and that at the request of the police he put a mental hold on Mr. Ehrlick. (Tr., p.5462, L.8 -
p.5490, L.6 (Dr. Randy Barnes); Tr., p.5644, L.17 - p.5654, L.3 (Jane Baker).) 
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Over defense objection, the State requested that it be allowed to present a 3-dimentional 
model purportedly of R.M.'s head in order to both help illustrate Dr. Groben's testimony, and in 
order to allow the jurors (without hearing expert testimony on the subject) to compare the model 
of the head to the model of the wall - the district court granted the State's request to allow 
Dr. Groben to use the model to illustrate his testimony but expressed concerns about the model 
of the head being used by the jury to compare to the model of the hole in the wall. (R., pp.866-
867; Tr., p.1458, L.4-p.1481, L.11; see also Tr., p.2758, L.14-p.2796, L.6 (Robert Thomas 
testifying about the creation of the model of the hole in the wall).) Wesley Neville, a forensic 
artist, created the model of R.M. 's head based upon the measurements and photos he was 
provided. (Tr., p.2718, L.17 - p.2741, L.2.) However, the model was inaccurate in two of three 
measures. (Tr., p.2796, L.11 p.2804, L.8 (Robert Karinen).) Over defense objection, the 
district court found that the model was admissible requiring only that the face be covered up 
prior to being admitted to the jury. (Tr., p.2935, L.2 - p.2942, L.15, p.5586, L.16 p.5587, 
L.19.) 
Daniel Ehrlick testified on his own behalf. (Tr., p.5882, L.22 - p.6145, L. l.) He testified, 
inter alia, to the following relevant information: that Ms. Jenkins was pregnant with A.J. when 
they met and that R.M. gave him a hug and told him that he wanted him to be his father the first 
time they met; that Ms. Jenkins was the one who made decisions regarding R.M.'s discipline; 
that Ms. Jenkins made up the story about R.M. hitting a horse with the stick without his 
knowledge, but he agreed to help her hide him from social worker when they visited because she 
told him that they would take R.M. away from her; that R.M. was alive and well on July 24th 
although he had vomited that day; that R.M. only began sleeping in the day bed/crib for a week 
or so because he could not sleep in the bunk bed with A.J. in the room and making noise; that he 
gave R.M. oatmeal and raisins after he complained about the lunch provided on the 24th; that 
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R.M. was in and out during the day; that when he was taking a shower with A.J., he slipped and 
hit his knee against the wall when he hurried out of the shower to answer his phone; that R.M. 
asked if he could go to a birthday party, he contacted Ms. Jenkins who was at work at the time, 
she said no, and he informed R.M.; that R.M. again asked if he could go the party and he again 
said no; that he last saw R.M. near the time that his father visited; that he realized R.M. had not 
checked-in in a while when he was preparing dinner and he began to search for him; that he 
contacted Ms. Jenkins and told her that R.M. was missing; that a little girl told him that she heard 
about a birthday party in the D building and they asked the residents if R.M. was there; that he 
then called 911; that he learned about "dead-bugging" from Josh Porter, he had R.M. do it about 
a half dozen times, that he once knelt beside/on him to keep him from wiggling, but that he never 
dropped his knees on him nor put his weight on him; that he had swatted R.M. on the buttocks 
twice on one occasion around the 4th of July; and, that he did not try to either harm himself or 
pretend like he was harming himself, he simply took too many Larazapam because he could not 
sleep. (Tr., p.5882, L.22 - p.6145, L.1.) Mr. Ehrlick repeatedly and consistently denied either 
harming R.M. or knowing what happened to him. (Tr., p.5882, L.22-p.6145, L.1.) 
After the court read the jury instructions and the parties gave their closing arguments, the 
jury retired to deliberate. (Tr., p.6193, L.25 - p.6436, L.24.) The jury convicted Mr. Ehrlick on 
both counts, they were unanimous in finding that he both murdered R.M. by torture, and by 
committing an aggravated battery upon him, and after further evidence was presented, found that 
he was a persistent violator of the law. (R., pp.1240-1243; Tr., p.6440, L.2 - p.6454, L.2.) The 
district court imposed consecutive life sentences. (R., pp.1284-1287.) Mr. Ehrlick filed a timely 
Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.1288-1293.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by allowing FBI Agent Martin to testify that 
eye witnesses who saw R.M. alive and well on July 24, 2009, were not credible? 
2. Did the district court err in admitting State's Exhibit 26-A, a model of R.M. 's head, as the 
exhibit was not relevant, could not assist the jury, and was overly prejudicial? 
3. Did the district court err by admitting highly prejudicial Rule 404(b) evidence that was 
not relevant to any issue other than propensity? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted the State's Second Motion in 
Limine regarding the presentation of evidence of Mr. Ehrlick's alleged attempt to alter 
and/or influence the testimony of Ms. Jenkins? 
5. Did the district court err in granting the State's Fifth Motion in Limine regarding the 
presentation of evidence of Mr. Ehrlick's emergency room visit on July 31, 2009? 
6. Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing Samantha Burnett to testify that 
others told her that they had not heard of a birthday party and that, in her lay opinion, the 
story of R.M. going to a birthday party did not make sense to her? 
7. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Ehrlick's request to question 
detective Brechweld as to whether K.D. told him that there was talk of a birthday party 
on July 24th as the statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted; rather, 
the statement was offered to rebut the State's theory that Mr. Ehrlick and Ms. Jenkins 
made up the birthday party story? 
8. Did the district court err in allowing the State to question Mr. Ehrlick regarding a custody 
agreement for R.A. and in allowing the custody agreement to be admitted as an exhibit 
although it was later withdrawn by the district court as improperly admitted? 
9. Did the State violate Mr. Ehrlick's right to a fair trial by committing prosecutorial 
misconduct? 
10. Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Ehrlick's Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process of law violated because the accumulation of errors 
deprived him of his right to a fair trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing FBI Agent Martin To Testify That Eye 
Witnesses Who Saw R.M. Alive And Well On July 24, 2009, Were Not Credible 
A. Relevant Factual Information 
Defense counsel repeatedly objected to FBI Agent Mary Martin's testimony regarding 
the credibility of eye witnesses who stated (and three of whom later testified), that they had seen 
R.M. alive and well on July 24th. Agent Martin testified that her role was to create a "research 
timeline" to determine the last time R.M. was seen, and she did so by conducting her own 
interviews and reviewing all of the other reports to try and find the last "credible" sighting. 
(Tr., p.4434, L.4 - p.4440, L.24.) Agent Martin testified that she and other investigators 
interviewed a 7 year-old girl, K.D., and that she determined that there were inconsistencies in 
K.D. 's statements. 13 (Tr., p.4450, L.23 p.4454, L.17.) When she was asked, "And based on 
your investigation did - were you able to determine whether or not that was a credible lead or a 
credible sighting?" defense counsel objected stating, "This is for the jury to decide." 
(Tr., p.4454, Ls.18-22.) Assured that Agent Martin would be giving her opinion based upon her 
expertise and her investigation, the court overruled the objection. (Tr., p.4454, L.23 - p.4455, 
L.2.) Agent Martin testified that she determined that K.D. did not provide a credible last 
sighting. (Tr., p.4455, Ls.4-6.) 
Agent Martin next testified that she reviewed "leads" brought in by two more juveniles, 
O.J. and LT., who also reported that they had seen R.M. on July 24th, and again over defense 
counsel's objection that her opinion invades the province of the jury, the court allowed Agent 
Martin to testify that she determined that neither juvenile provided a credible last sighting of 
13 On cross-examination, without objection from the prosecutor, Agent Martin testified that K.D. had told her that 
she had been swinging with R.M. in the playground the afternoon of July 24 th• (Tr., p.4466, Ls.3-6.) 
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R.M. (Tr., p.4455, L.7 p.4457, L.6.) Agent Martin further testified that she investigated reports 
of other people who said they saw R.M. in the pool area on the 24th and, again over defense 
counsel's objection that her opinion invades the province of the jury and that "The jury is the 
sole judge of credibility here, not this witness," the district court allowed Agent Martin to testify 
that she did not find any sightings that she believed to be credible. (Tr., p.4457, L.8 - p.4458, 
L.14.) Agent Martin testified that, "There were several reports that [R.M.] had been at the pool 
and in the hot tub that day with other children," and over defense counsel's "asked and 
answered" objection, Agent Martin testified that she was not able to find a last credible sighting 
of R.M. (Tr., p.4459, L. 15 - p.4460, L.16.) 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing Agent Martin To Testify That Eye 
Witnesses Who Saw R.M. Alive And Well On July 24, 2009, Were Not Credible 
Idaho appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a lower 
court's decision to either admit or exclude evidence. State v. Almaraz, _Idaho_, 2013 
Opinion No. 41 (April 1, 2013), p.5 (quoting White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888 (2004).) 
Furthermore, '" A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of 
discretion, (2) acts within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal 
standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason."' Id ( quoting Fazzio v. 
Mason, 150 Idaho 591, 594 (2011).) 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 governs that admissibility of expert testimony and states, 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified 
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
I.R.E. 702 (emphasis added). "Expert testimony that only vouches for the credibility of another 
witness 'encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility 
determinations, and therefore does not "assist the trier of fact" as required by Rule 702."' 
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Almaraz, at 19 (quoting State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520,525 (2003).) 
In Almaraz, this Court addressed both the extent and the limit of an expert's ability to 
opine on the credibility of another witness. Almaraz at 19-20. The Almaraz Court recognized, 
Expert testimony that only vouches for the credibility of another witness 
"encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility 
determinations, and therefore does not 'assist the trier of fact' as required by 
Rule 702." State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 1235 (2003). 
However, expert opinion testimony that is admissible under I.R.E. 702 "is not 
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact." I.R.E. 704. Indeed, we have routinely held that "an expert's opinion, in a 
proper case, is admissible up to the point where an expression of opinion would 
require the expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of 
disputed evidence. To venture beyond that point, however, is to usurp the 
jury's function." Perry, 139 Idaho at 525, 81 P.3d at 1235 (quoting State v. 
Hester, 114 Idaho 688,696, 760 P.2d 27, 35 (1988)). 
Id. at 19 ( emphasis added). The Almaraz Court concluded that while the district court was 
correct in not allowing the expert to opine as to whether or not the eye witness' identification 
was accurate, the district court abused its discretion by not allowing the defendant's duly 
qualified expert to testify about the problems associated with the specific procedures associated 
with a witness' identification of the defendant as the guilty person. Id. at 19-20. 
In the present case, over defense counsel's repeated objections that the testimony 
"invades the province of the jury," the district court allowed Agent Martin to express her 
opinion, based upon her expertise and investigation, that eyewitnesses who told law enforcement 
that they saw R.M. alive and well on July 24th were not credible. The district court abused its 
discretion as this testimony does not assist the jury as allowed by I.R.E. 702; rather, the 
testimony usurps the jury's function. 
C. The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Error Is Harmless 
Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous objection and the appellant 
shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
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Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). "To hold an error as harmless, an 
appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable 
possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Sharp, 101 
Idaho 498,507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 
The State's case was entirely circumstantial. Although Mr. Ehrlick admitted to physically 
abusing R.M. on a few isolated occasions and that he had been responsible for causing some 
bruising, his admitted actions were incapable of causing the injuries that led to R.M.'s death. 
(Tr., p.5882, L.22 - p.6145, L.1 (Mr. Ehrlick's testimony).) The State presented no witnesses 
who testified that Mr. Ehrlick was physically abusive to R.M. in the days leading up to R.M. 's 
disappearance, and the one person who could potentially have been able to present such 
testimony (if in fact Mr. Ehrlick had abused R.M.), Melissa Jenkins, was not called as a witness. 
The State's silence on this issue speaks volumes about the weakness of their case. Furthermore, 
there was no forensic evidence supporting the conclusion that Mr. Ehrlick caused the injuries 
that led to R.M.' s death. In fact, the one piece of DNA evidence presented at trial supports 
Mr. Ehrlick's claim that he put his knee, not R.M.'s head, through the drywall in the apartment. 
(Tr., p.1836, L.22 - p.1837, L.16, p.1878, L.24 - p.1880, L.5 (William Schneck, testifying that 
he removed the hairs from the wall); Tr., p.5827, L.7-p.5828, L.11, p.5849, L.15 p.5854, L.24 
(Dr. Greg Hampikian, testifying about the results of the DNA testing on the hairs).) 
The State acknowledged the vital importance of discrediting the eyewitnesses who saw 
R.M. alive and well on July 24th• While addressing a defense objection to an earlier question 
posed to Agent Martin, the prosecutor stated, "Frankly, it's been the state's position from the 
beginning that [R.M.] was never outside on the 24th ." (Tr., p.4445, Ls.5-7.) During its opening 
statement, the State implied that Mr. Ehrlick lied to officers when he told them R.M. disappeared 
from the playground and argued, "We'll prove to you beyond a reasonable doubt [R.M.] never 
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left that apartment. He never went out to play that day. [R.M.] was already too sick and too hurt 
and too injured to go out to play." (Tr., p.1269, L.20 - p.1270, L.11.) The State argued during 
closing that, "[R.M] never left the house on July 24, 2009. He was not outside playing. He never 
left under his own power because he was dead before the defendant called 9-1-1." (Tr., p.6224, 
Ls. I 0-13.) The State additionally argued, 
There was no credible sighting of that child outside on July 24th• 
You heard Mary Martin with the FBI. You heard from Detective Rawson. 
They followed up on lead after lead after lead after lead, and their sole purpose 
was to find a credible sighting of [R.M.] outside on the 24th, and they didn't find a 
single one. 
(Tr., p.6295, Ls.18-25.) The State further argued that the last verifiable sighting of R.M. occurred 
on July 22, 2009, by a neighbor, Carol Carillo, and no one saw him alive after that. (Tr., p.6307, 
Ls.20-23.) Finally, in their rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor argued, "But the biggest 
coincidence of them all absolutely proves that either this is a phenomenal coincidence or Danny 
Ehrlick has not told the truth. [R.M.] never went outside on the 24th." (Tr., p.6429, Ls.4-7.) 
Evidence that R.M. was outside playing with friends on July 24th is devastating to the 
State's already weak, circumstantial case. If the jury believed that eyewitnesses saw R.M. alive 
and well during the afternoon and evening of July 24th, in order to convince the jury that 
Mr. Ehr lick was guilty, the State would have had to prove that Mr. Ehrlick killed R.M. and 
dumped his body in the canal in a very short period of time, i.e., sometime after he was last seen 
alive and sometime before Mr. Ehrlick spoke with people in the pool area. However, the medical 
evidence would not support such a conclusion. 
Dr. Groben testified that although he could not opine whether the head injury would be 
immediately fatal, death would have occurred within hours of the injury, and that a person 
suffering such an injury would likely be lethargic, nauseous and vomiting. (Tr., p.1541, L.9 -
p.1557, L.10.) Dr. Groben testified that R.M. would have died between 6 and 12 hours after 
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sustaining the abdominal injury. (Tr., p.1617, Ls.6-17.) Thus, in order to convince the jury that 
Mr. Ehrlick inflicted those blows, the jury would have had to conclude that R.M. was playing 
outside with friends after suffering painful and ultimately fatal abdominal and head injuries 
while not showing any signs of lethargy or nausea and with no indication that he was in any pain. 
Additionally, there would simply have been no way that Mr. Ehrlick could have inflicted the 
fatal injuries to R.M. in the late evening hours of July 24th and taken his body up to the canal, 
without being seen. The complex was crawling with people, Mr. Ehrlick did not have a car, and 
there were busy roads and multiple houses in between and surrounding the complex and the 
canal. (See generally, Tr.) The State acknowledged this weakness in their case arguing, 
How and when this defendant got [R.M.]'s body to the canal. You didn't 
hear any testimony about that. Do I wish that I could come up here and tell you 
that we know how that happened? Absolutely. But we can't. We don't know how 
it is, and we don't know when that body got into the canal, but that is not an 
element of the crime. Disposal of the body and way that it's done is not an 
element of the crime. And so don't let yourselves get hung up on the fact that 
there's no evidence presented about how and specifically when the body got into 
the canal. 
(Tr., p.6306, Ls.14-25.) 
Furthermore, the harm of Agent Martin's testimony is not merely a theoretical argument. 
Detective Rawson testified that he spoke with some people who believed that they had played 
with R.M. on the 24th. (Tr., p.3820, L.23 p.3821, L.2.) Mr. Ehrlick presented witnesses who 
testified that they saw R.M. alive and well on July 24th. O.J. who was 15 at the time of trial and 
lived in the apartment complex, testified that he first met R.M. a couple weeks before he went 
missing, and that he tried to teach him how to swim. (Tr., p.5700, L.3 - p.5705, L.5.) On July 
24t\ after he ate his lunch, he started riding his bike around the complex and saw R.M. swinging 
at the park right next to the pool, and he spoke to him for a short time. (Tr., p.5705, L.16 -
p.5710, L.8.) O.J. went home for a while, came back out, and saw and spoke with R.M. again 
who told him that he was going to go to the store. (Tr., p.5710, L.9 - p.5711, L.l 1.) Later he 
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saw Mr. Ehrlick running around yelling that his son was missing. (Tr., p.5711, L.12 p.5712, 
L. 13.) O.J. spoke with law enforcement officers in the following days and told them what he 
saw. (Tr., p.5712, L.14 p.5713, L.6.) Agent Martin specifically told the jury that she did not 
find O.J. to be credible. (Tr., p.4455, L.7 p.4457, L.6.) 
Additionally, M.R. who was 17 at the time R.M. went missing, testified that she was 
visiting her friend C.G., and the two of them took C.G. 's younger siblings to the pool around 
6:30 p.m. (Tr., p.5679, L.21 p.5686, L.18.) M.R. testified that she saw R.M., whom she had 
seen before at the complex and knew by name, near the pool area playing with C.G.'s youngest 
siblings and K.D. later in the evening (Tr., p.5686, L.19 - p.5692, L.8.) M.R. testified that she 
has been interviewed by Agent Martin and others several times, and that she told Agent Martin 
the same information that she testified to and that she is positive she saw R.M. (Tr., p.5693, Ls.9-
23.) Finally, Jennifer Hastings, another neighbor who had taken her kids down to the pool on 
July 24th, testified that she was shown a picture of R.M. on the night of the 24th by an officer and 
that she told the officer that she had, in fact, seen R.M. in the pool area. (Tr., p.5739, L.7 
p.5751, L.1.) 
In short, Agent Martin testified that O.J., M.R. and Ms. Hastings were not credible. Her 
testimony infringed upon the province of the jury in determining who was and who was not 
credible. The lynchpin holding the State's fragile case together was the myth that nobody saw 
R.M. alive and well on July 24th. Agent Martin's testimony held that myth together. The State 
will simply be unable to demonstrate that Agent Martin's opinion that that these eyewitnesses 
were not credible, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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II. 
The District Court Erred In Admitting State's Exhibit 26-A, A Model OfR.M.'s Head, As The 
Exhibit Was Not Relevant, Could Not Assist The Jury, And Was Overly Prejudicial 
A. Relevant Factual Information 
Prior to trial, Mr. Ehrlick filed an Objection to Proposed Evidence objecting to the 
admission of a model head produced by Mr. Wesley Neville. (R., pp.866-867.) Two hearings 
were conducted on the motion. (Tr., p.1458, L.4 - p.1481, L.13, p.2925, L.14 - p.2942, L.24.) 
At the first hearing, the State noted that it intended to introduce the model head as a 
demonstrative exhibit for Dr. Groben to use in illustrating where R.M.' s injuries were without 
indicating, at that time, that it was a "replica size-wise of [R.M. 's] head" and that, at a later time, 
they would lay additional foundation for the item to be admitted as an exhibit. (Tr., p.1464, L.23 
- p.1465, L.5.) The State argued that the model would assist the trier of fact by allowing them to 
see a relationship in size between R.M. 's head and a hole found in the wall of the apartment. 
(Tr., p.1467, L.23 -p.1468, L.2.) The State represented that it was not going to call an expert to 
testify that the hole in the wall matched R.M.' s head; that it was just being offered for the jury to 
compare the hole and the model, but noting that if "you match them up in the area where the 
head would have had to strike a solid object to cause the injury that R.M. received, it's a perfect 
fit." (Tr., p.1469, L.23 - p.1470, L.15.) The State continued, "once we have established that this 
mock-up is nearly identical to the size and shape of R.M. 's head, I think we've laid sufficient 
foundation for the item to come in. And once we establish that the mock-up of the hole is 
identical ... I guess I don't think that we need to have somebody come in a say this is exactly 
how the hole would have been created." (Tr., p.1474, L.18 - p.1475, L.l.) The district court 
allowed the model head to be used by Dr. Groben because it would assist the jury and was "not 
going to be tied to anyone's head in particular, but to illustrate where the injuries were on the 
head." (Tr., p.1480, Ls.11-20.) However, the court noted that it was "concerned about the jurors 
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taking the head into the jury room and putting it up against the wall and seeing if it fits, or 
whatever, where [the State has] not laid foundation through an expert to - that's done that. I 
don't know. I'll have to think about the next step, using it as an illustrative exhibit." (Tr., 
p.1481, Ls.5-11.) 
Prior to the second hearing on the admissibility of the model head, the State presented the 
testimony of the experts involved in creating the model and measuring both R.M. 's actual head 
and the model. Mr. Neville testified that he was provided with three measurements (height of 
face, width of face, and circumference) and photographs of R.M. to assist in making the model of 
R.M.'s head. (Tr., p.2736, Ls.21-24, p.2737, Ls.14-19.) Mr. Neville did not examine any part of 
R.M.'s body. (Tr., p.2737, Ls.1-5.) Mr. Neville enlarged the photograph to the measurements 
provided and used the photograph to "semi-accurately" place features. (Tr., p.2737, L.17 
p.2738, L.14.) He acknowledged that there could have been camera distortion. (Tr., p.2738, 
Ls.11-14.) He checked the model for accuracy by taking half of the sculpture and half of the 
photograph and morphing the two; "everything was lined up pretty good." (Tr., p.2740, Ls.13-
22.) Mr. Neville noted that one of the "great measurements I had was the circumference of the 
head," implying that that measurement was very important in crafting the model. (Tr., p.2749, 
Ls.21-22.) Yet, he was not able to pin-point where the circumference was measured on the skull. 
(Tr., p.2750, Ls.8-11.) Mr. Neville noted that he does not normally make model heads without a 
skull to work from, but that he did what he could to make the model accurate. (Tr., p.2751, Ls.2-
17.) 
Robert Karinen, an employee of the coroner's office, explained that when he took the 
measurement of R.M.'s head he determined that the circumference was 53 centimeters, breadth 
was 14.5 centimeters, and length was 16.8 centimeters. (Tr., p.2801, Ls.16-24.) After the model 
was completed and sent to the Boise Police Department, Mr. Karinen went to the police satiation, 
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measured the model, and compared the measurements of the model to his measurements of 
R.M.'s head. (Tr., p.2802, Ls.1-7.) The length measurement matched up. (Tr., p.2802, Ls.15-
24.) However, the other two showed that the model was inaccurate: the breadth of R.M.'s head 
was 14.5 centimeters, the model was 13.8 centimeters, a difference of .7 centimeters; the 
circumference of R.M.'s head was 53 centimeters, the model was 49.5 centimeters, a difference 
of 3.5 centimeters. (Tr., p.2802, L.25 - p.2804, L.5.) Mr. Karinen also noted that the breadth 
measurement is taken at the widest part of the head, not at a specific location and the location is 
different for every person. (Tr., p.2805, L.21 -p.2806, L.17.) 
At the second hearing, the State argued that the discrepancies in the size of the model and 
R.M. 's head were "very, very minor" noting that while two of the measurements were incorrect, 
"one of the measurements was in fact accurate." (Tr., p.2926, Ls.17-21.) The State asserted that 
"it's safe to say that this is a very fair representation of the size and shape of R.M. 's head based 
on the measurements that were given." (Tr., p.2926, Ls.21-24.) The State continued that the 
exhibit was relevant to show how significant the two inch contusion was, to see the actual size of 
the head, and to help determine how the injury occurred whether R.M.'s head went through the 
wall. (Tr., p.2926, L.25 - p.2929, L.23.) The State went on to further elaborate: 
Dr. Groben again testified that he had a 2-inch bruise, 2-inch contusion of 
his head. And I think this model being accurate to size helps the jury understand 
how significant that really is. Because obviously, a 2-inch contusion or a 2-inch 
bruise on a smaller child's head is going to cover more surface area and be more 
significant, in terms of the area covered, than a 2-inch contusion or a 2-inch 
bruise would be on a larger adult head. And so I think for that reason, it assist the 
trier of fact in understanding really how big, relative to [R.M]'s size, this injury 
was. 
. .. the jury will get to determine whether they believe that it was actually 
Mr. Ehrlick's head that went through the wall or not. They'll be able to determine 
whether or not they think he's credible, and the size of the head versus the size of 
the hole is relative to that determination. 
We haven't had anybody come in and testify to this, but I think the jury 
can find, if they choose to do so, and they believe that that is the truth, that the 
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model of the head matches up perfectly with the model of the hole in the wall. And 
I think that's a decision that they get to make as the trier of fact as to what exactly 
the mechanism of injury was. And I think the model, in conjunction with the 
model of the hole, will help them do that. 
(Tr., p.2930, L.9 - p.2931, L.16 ( emphasis added).) The State maintained that it was not 
necessary to have an expert make the comparison between the model head and hole in the wall, 
but that the jury could make the comparison. (Tr., p.2933, Ls.14-25.) 
Mr. Ehrlick again asserted his objections noting that there was no precision, restating the 
differences in the measurements, that the model was made without a skull, that Mr. Neville was 
only able to semi-accurately place features on the model, that the model was prejudicial, and that 
the exhibit does not aid the jury "if it's in fact a demonstrative piece of evidence. I don't know 
that there's foundation that the jury should be allowed to use lay testimony or lay opinion as to 
whether the hole - the head fits the hole in any particular way." (Tr., p.2935, L.2 - p.2938, L.8.) 
Ultimately, the district court found that the model was admissible as this type of scientific 
evidence had been accepted within the scientific community as well as the procedures for 
producing this type of evidence. (Tr., p.2940, Ls.1-8.) The court also found that the exhibit "was 
very close to the actual size of his head .... what I notice about the head when I looked at it was 
that it shows just how small [R.M.] was. And so you see pictures of him, but the exhibit gives 
better information as to the size of [R.M.]." (Tr., p.2940, Ls.18-24.) The court also noted that 
the model assists they jury in understanding that the two inch contusion is "substantially larger" 
than it would be on an adult head. (Tr., p.2941, Ls.7-12.) The district court was concerned about 
the face of the model being in the jury room, determined that it was prejudicial, and ordered that 
the face be covered prior to the exhibits admission. (Tr., p.2942, Ls.1-15.) The face was later 
covered and the model head was admitted. (Tr., p.5587, Ls.1-19.) 
B. The Model Head Was Not Relevant; Therefore, It Was Not Admissible 
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the district court erred in admitting the model head because it was 
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not relevant. 14 "Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. I.R.E. 401. Relevant evidence is admissible 
unless otherwise prohibited by the Rules of Evidence, while evidence that is not relevant is not 
admissible. I.R.E. 402. Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law that is freely reviewed. 
State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228 (2008). 
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that because the model of the head was inaccurate, it could not assist 
the jury in determining the actual size of R.M.' s head, by illustrating the size of a two inch 
contusion compared to R.M.'s head, or in any comparison ofR.M.'s head to the hole in the wall. 
Although the State repeatedly argued that the head was a very fair representation involving only 
a "very, very minor" difference and the district court agreed, in fact, as testified to by the State's 
own witness, the head is simply not accurate. Based upon the difference in measurements the 
model was inaccurate by 4.83 percent on the breadth and 6.6 percent on the circumference. 
The difference of 3 .5 centimeters makes a very significant difference in the size of a 
head, especially in a child. For example, a head with the circumference of 49.5 centimeters (the 
model) would wear a children's small hat and would be considered to be the circumference of an 
infant or toddler head for s1zmg purposes. See Hat Sizing Chart, 
http://www.ubs.iastate.edu/hat_sizing_chart.html, accessed on May 10, 2013. However, a child 
with a 53 centimeter circumference head like R.M.'s would wear a children's large hat and 
would be considered to be the circumference of a child or youth head for sizing purposes. Id In 
fact, a head circumference of 49.5 centimeters is considered to be in the 50th percentile for an 
14Mr. Ehrlick does not challenge the use of the model head by Dr. Groben during his testimony, at that time, not 
identified as being a model of Robert's head, to illustrate to the jury where the contusion was on the skull, but to the 
admission of the exhibit for any other purpose; specifically, as a model of Robert's head, to illustrate how large the 
contusion would be in comparison to the model, or for comparison to the hole in the wall. 
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infant of 33.5 months of age and in the 75th percentile for an infant of 23.5 months of age. See 
CDC Data Table of Infant Head Circumference-for-age Charts, http://www.cdc.gov/growth-
charts/html_ charts/hcageinf.htm, accessed on May 14, 2013. The few centimeter disparity results 
in a model with the head circumference of an infant/toddler under 3 years old compared to that 
of an 8-year-old boy. This difference is critically significant, not "very, very minor." 
The admission of an exhibit for demonstrative purposes depends on whether the exhibit 
supplements the testimony of witnesses or assists the jury in obtaining a better understanding of 
facts in issue. Jtfasters v. Dewey, 109 Idaho 576, 579 (Ct. App. 1985). Exhibits are inadmissible 
for demonstrative purposes "when they do not illustrate or make clearer some issue in the case-
that is, where they are irrelevant or immaterial-or where they are of such a character as to 
prejudice the jury." Id. (quoting Workman v. McIntyre Construction Co., 617 P.2d 1281, 1291 
(Mont.1980) ). 
The State repeatedly asserted that the admission was necessary to show the size of the 
two inch contusion in comparison to R.M.'s head because of the significant difference in size 
between R.M.'s head and an adult head. (Tr., p.2926, L.25 -p.2929, L.23, p.2930, L.9-p.2931, 
L.16.) Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the same logic applies in determining that the evidence is not 
relevant as a two inch contusion is far more significant on a toddler's head, or a head the size of 
the model, than it is on the head of 8-year-old boy. Because the model cannot give the jurors any 
legitimate frame of reference to compare the two inch contusion to R.M. 's actual head size, the 
evidence is not relevant for this purpose. 
The State also asserted that the head was relevant and would assist the jury in 
determining if R.M.'s head injury was from making contact with a wall by allowing them to 
compare the hole in the wall to the model of the head. (Tr., p.1467, L.23 - p.1468, L.6, p.2929, 
Ls.13-20.) In support of this argument, the State noted that the head was a "perfect fit" and "that 
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the model of the head matches up perfectly with the model of the hole in the wall." (Tr., p.1470, 
L.15, p.2931, Ls. I 0-11.) Mr. Ehr lick asserts that the fact that the model was a perfect fit strongly 
lends to the argument that the model is not relevant as it shows only that R.M. 's actual head size 
does not fit "perfectly" into the hole, in the prosecution's opinion. Again, because of the model's 
inaccuracy, it cannot give the jurors any legitimate frame of reference to compare the hole in the 
wall to R.M. 's actual head size, the evidence is not relevant for this purpose. 
As such, the model of the head does not have the "tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence." Therefore, it was error for the district court to admit the 
evidence as it was not relevant. 
Fmiher, Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the model of the head should not have been admitted 
because it was not scientifically valid evidence. He asserts that the model is the equivalent of a 
report created by an expert and the admission of the model is tantamount to admitting expert 
testimony. Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. In order 
for expert testimony to be deemed reliable it must be scientifically valid. Expert opinion which is 
speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its 
verdict and, therefore, is inadmissible as evidence. Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 
834, 838 (2007). "The question under the evidence rule is simply whether the expert's 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact; not whether the information upon which the expert's 
opinion is based is commonly agreed upon." State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 646 (1998). The 
focus of the court's inquiry is on the "principles and methodology" used not the conclusions they 
generate. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993)). 
When an "expert's opinion is based upon scientific knowledge, there must likewise be a 
scientific basis for that opinion" because if the reasoning or methodology underlying the opinion 
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is not scientifically sound, then the opinions would not assist a trier of fact. Weeks, 143 Idaho at 
838 (quoting Swallow v. Emergency Med. of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592 (2003)). 
Mr. Neville's model was not admissible because it was not created based upon sound 
scientific principles. Mr. Neville was not able to create the model in the normal way because he 
did not have a skull to work from, acknowledged that there could have been issues with camera 
distortion in the photograph he used, was not able to pin-point where the circumference was 
measured at, was only able to "semi-accurately" place features, and could only do what he could 
to make the model accurate. (Tr., p.2737, L.17 - p.2738, L.14, p.2750, Ls.8-11, p.2751, Ls.2-17.) 
Moreover, we know for a fact that, despite his best efforts, Mr. Neville got the model wrong 
because Mr. Karinen compared the model with the actual measurement of R.M.'s head and two 
of the measurements taken from the model were inaccurate. (Tr., p.2802, L.25 - p.2804, L.5.) 
The model, being inaccurate, could not assist the jury. As such, because the model was 
inaccurate and not created in the normal or scientific way, the model was inadmissible and not 
relevant. 
C. Absent Expert Testimony, The Model Was Inadmissible As It Could Not Assist The Jury 
Expert testimony is admissible if it will inform the jury about a matter that is outside the 
common experience and knowledge of a lay juror and will assist the jury in deciding a material 
issue in the case. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688,694 (1988); State v. Wright, 147 Idaho 150, 155 
(Ct. App. 2009). In the case at hand, defense counsel raised concerns about whether the model 
head could assist the jury and whether the jury should or could use the model head to evaluate 
how the head fits into the wall without expert testimony on that issue. (Tr., p.2937, Ls.13-21.) 
The district court was uneasy about this stating that it was "concerned about the jurors taking the 
head into the jury room and putting it up against the wall and seeing it fits, or whatever, where 
[the State has] not laid foundation through an expert to that's done that. I don't know. I'll have 
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to think about the next step, using it an illustrative exhibit." (Tr., p.1481, Ls.5-11.) Although the 
district court again asked about the State not presenting an expert on this issue at the second 
hearing, the district court ultimately allowed the exhibit without specifically addressing this 
expert issue. (Tr., p.2933, Ls.20-24, p.2940, L.1- p.2942, L.24.) 
Mr. Ehrlick maintains that the model head cannot assist the jury without expert testimony 
regarding how the model fits together with the hole in the wall. The ability to determine if the 
two items match up is outside the ken of the average juror. The issue is related to more than 
simply putting two puzzle pieces together, but involves an understanding of scientific principles. 
In order to determine whether one specific object made the hole in the wall, one must look at the 
force exerted, the dynamics of how a solid object affects drywall as opposed to more solid or 
softer surfaces, and so on. 
It would be necessary to have an expert testify regarding this issue even if the model of 
the head had been accurate. For example, if the issue was comparing a bullet to a bullet hole, an 
expert would be called to testify about density, angles, velocity, and friction, as well as, 
comparisons between the size of the hole and the size of the bullet. It would not be left to lay 
jurors to merely take a model of the bullet and compare it to the hole in the wall. This case 
requires similar expert testimony to assist the jury. 
Allowing the jury to compare the items is even more troubling when the items are not 
accurately sized. Following the example above, if the jury was given a bullet that was more than 
five percent smaller than the actual bullet and found that it fit perfectly through the hole, they 
may determine that the State has proven that the hole was caused by such a bullet regardless of 
whether or not scientific evidence would support this conclusion. However, an accurate model of 
the bullet may not actually fit into the bullet hole at all. The same holds true for the model of 
R.M.' s head and the hole in the wall. Without an expert's testimony to assist them, the jury could 
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not make a determination of whether or not the hole and the model matched up or more 
pertinently if R.M.' s head matched up to the hole in the wall. 
As such, it was error for the district court to allow for the admission of the model head 
because, without further expert testimony, the model could not assist the jury in determining 
whether or not the hole was caused by R.M. 's head. 
D. The Probative Value Is Outweighed By The Prejudicial Effect 
Exhibits are inadmissible for demonstrative purposes when they do not illustrate or make 
clearer some issue in the case, or where they are of such character as to prejudice a party. 
Masters, 109 Idaho at 579. The appropriate test is an I.R.E. 403 balancing of probative value 
against the dangers of unfair prejudice, distraction, confusion of issues, and waste of time. Id. 
When reviewing the determination that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by 
unfair prejudice, the abuse of discretion standard is applied. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816 (Ct. 
App. 1993). 
As noted above, the evidence has no probative value and is not relevant. Assuming 
arguendo that this Court finds the evidence was relevant, there is a great danger of prejudice to 
Mr. Ehrlick. First, as discussed above the model was not accurate, with a circumference disparity 
resulting in a head that was not the size of an 8-year-old boy like R.M., but of an infant/toddler. 
In discussing the model, the district court was careful to note that model of the head showed just 
how small R.M. was. (Tr., p.2940, Ls.18-24.) Clearly, if the size of the model was striking and 
noted by the district court for illustrating how small R.M. was, it would have a similar and 
equally inappropriate effect on the jury as well. 
Further, the State discussed how important the model was to illustrate the size of the two 
inch bruise. (Tr., p.2926, L.25 - p.2929, L.23, p.2930, L.9 - p.2931, L.16.) Again, the 
inaccuracy of the model give the jury an inaccurate special reference which makes the injury 
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seem larger in comparison to the head than it actually was. This not only provides the jury with 
inaccurate information, but may contribute to a stronger emotional response by the jury. 
Additionally, the sizing inaccuracy of the model could have affected the way the jury evaluated 
all evidence, not just issues related to the head and head injuries. 
In evaluating the prejudicial effect of admitting the model, the district court was 
concerned about the accuracy of the face. (Tr., p.2942, Ls.1-24.) Ultimately, the model was not 
admitted until the face was covered. (Tr., p.5587, Ls.1-19.) However, this did not entirely cure 
the prejudice that the district court was concerned about, because the jury had already seen the 
uncovered face of the model when Dr. Groben used it as an illustrative exhibit. 
As such, Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the district comi abused its discretion by admitting the 
model head because the evidence's prejudicial effect outweighs any potential probative value. 
E. The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Error Is Harmless 
Because the district court's erroneous ruling was preserved by a timely objection, the 
State bears the burden of proving the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Additional 
harmless error arguments and authority can be found in section I(C) and are incorporated herein 
by reference. The State cannot show the error was harmless in this case. Mr. Ehrlick maintains 
that the error was not harmless. The error had even greater effect when coupled with the 
prosecution's statement to the jury that, "you have the head; you have the wall. You can make 
your own determination as to whether the head fits into the hole, and you can do that back in 
deliberations." (Tr., p.6313, Ls.1-4.) In effect, the jury has been told to go ahead and try to fit 
the models together like puzzle pieces, regardless of the inaccuracy of the model head. The 
purpose of sending exhibits to the jury room is to enable the jury to examine them and to make 
such simple tests of the exhibits as may be proper. State v. Foell, 37 Idaho 722, _, 217 P. 608, 
609 ( 1923). There was no limiting instruction given to the jury about what was proper conduct 
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with the models and after the State's suggestion, there is little doubt that the jury did just as the 
State suggested. As such, the State cannot show the error was harmless. 
III. 
The District Court Erred By Admitting Highly Prejudicial Rule 404(b) Evidence That Was Not 
Relevant To Any Issue Other Than Propensity 
A. Relevant Factual Information 
In August of 2010, the State filed the State's First Notice of Intent To Present I.R.E. 
404(b) Evidence Against Ehrlick and a Memorandum in Support. (S.R., pp.212-240.) The 
motion sought to admit the testimony of several witnesses who had allegedly been mistreated by 
Mr. Ehrlick in the past. (S.R., pp.212-240.) The defense objected to the admission of the 
evidence. (S.R., pp.348-367.) In September of 2010, the district court heard argument on the 
404(b) issue and filed an order allowing the testimony of two of Mr. Ehrlick's ex-girlfriends as 
relevant to show intent, allowing the State to revisit the motion regarding a third ex-girlfriend 
and family members after an offer of proof, and denying the admission of all other requested 
404(b) evidence. (S.R., pp.398-411.) In April of 2011, the issue of allowing the I.RE. 404(b) 
testimony of the ex-girlfriends was re-visited following defense counsel's motion to reconsider. 
(S.R., pp.968-974.) The motion to reconsider was denied and the district court broadened its 
ruing including intent, motive, and identity as grounds for the admission of the I.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence. (R., p.837.) 
At trial, the three ex-girlfriends were allowed to testify. Misty Barnett (formally 
Schoonover) testified that approximately 20 years ago, when she was seventeen, she had been 
involved in a violent relationship with Mr. Ehrlick, who was around the same age. (Tr., p.2809, 
L.5 - p.2813, L.1; p.2828, Ls.10-17.) During their six-month relationship Mr. Ehrlick was 
verbally abusive, would choke Ms. Barnett, on two occasions causing her to lose consciousness, 
kick or hit her, causing bruising, and keep her in an apartment against her will. (Tr., p.2813, L.1 
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- p.2820, L.11.) This abuse occurred frequently, sometimes daily. (Tr., p.2813, L.1 - p.2820, 
LI I.) Ms. Barnett believed that Mr. Ehrlick took pleasure in abusing her because he had "an evil 
look on his face" when the abuse occurred. (Tr., p.2821, Ls.5-10.) After Ms. Barnett left the 
relationship, Mr. Ehrlick continued to verbally threaten her. (Tr., p.2823, L.5 - p.2826, L.24.) 
Kelly Marshall testified that in 1997, she was involved in an abusive relationship with 
Mr. Ehrlick. (Tr., p.2834, L.4 - p.2837, L.24.) Mr. Ehrlick was mentally and physically abusive 
about 80 percent of the time they were together. (Tr., p.2838, L.3 - p.2839, L.20.) Mr. Ehrlick 
had choked her to the point she lost consciousness, spit in her face, pulled her hair, dragged her 
outside when she was nude, called her names, threw her out of a moving vehicle, beat her face, 
kicked her, and restrained her access to others. (Tr., p.2839, L.21 - p.2845, L.19.) As a result of 
the abuse, she suffered facial contusions, bruises, and loose teeth. (Tr., p.2846, L.23 - p.2847, 
L.3.) Ms. Marshall made one report to police regarding the abuse and photographs related to the 
report were admitted as evidence of the abuse in Mr. Ehrlick' s trial. (Tr., p.2848, Ls.21-24; 
State's Exhibit Nos. 63-A, B, C, and D.) After she left Mr. Ehrlick, he continued to verbally 
threaten her. (Tr., p.2849, L.24 - p.2850, L.8.) Ms. Marshall believed that Mr. Ehrlick took 
pleasure in causing her pain because he never apologized or had any remorse. (Tr., p.2840, L.20 
-p.2841, L.2, p.2850, Ls.9-12.) 
Alexis Palmer testified that she was involved with Mr. Ehrlick for a few months in early 
2004. (Tr., p.2872, Ls.6-23.) During the relationship, Mr. Ehrlick was emotionally and 
physically abusive, engaging in choking, pulling hair, controlling behavior, and name-calling. 
(Tr., p.2875, L.5 - p.2880, L.3.) Ms. Palmer noted that Mr. Ehrlick would be fine one minute 
and then in an instant be in a bad mood, slamming stuff. (Tr., p.2877, Ls.1-17.) She also 
believed that Mr. Ehrlick enjoyed "being mean" because he would never apologize and would 
"smirk." (Tr., p.2878, Ls.3-23.) Ms. Palmer was also allowed to testify that she tried to commit 
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suicide at the end of her relationship because, "At that point I would rather be dead than in a 
relationship with him." (Tr., p.2880, Ls.4-7.) 
During the testimony, defense counsel objected to the admission of the testimony on 
approximately 38 distinct occasions. (Tr., p.2811, L.17 -p.2878, L.7.) 
There was no limiting instruction given immediately prior or following the testimony of 
these women. The only limiting instruction regarding the above I.R.E. 404(b) testimony was 
given in the final jury instructions and stated the following: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant 
committed crimes, wrongs or acts other than that for which the defendant is on 
trial. 
Such evidence, if believed, is not to be considered by you to prove the 
defendant's character or that the defendant has a disposition to commit crimes. 
Such evidence may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of proving 
the defendant's motive, oppo1iunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake or accident, or state of mind. 
(R., p.1212.) 
B. The District Court Erred By Admitting Highly Prejudicial Rule 404(b) Evidence That 
Was Not Relevant To Any Issue Other Than Propensity 
Idaho appellate Courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a lower 
court's decision to either admit or exclude evidence. State v. Almaraz, Idaho_, 2013 
Opinion No. 41 (April 1, 2013), p.5 (quoting White, 140 Idaho at 888.) Under I.R.E. 404(b), 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to show a defendant's criminal 
propensity. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010). "It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident," if the prosecution has provided notice that it intends 
to produce the evidence. Id; I.R.E. 404(b). Yet, under I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be 
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excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." 
State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214,219 (2000). 
In determining whether I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was properly admitted, the appellate court 
employs a two-step analysis, determining: (1) whether, under I.R.E. 404(b ), the evidence is 
relevant as a matter of law to an issue other than the defendant's character or criminal propensity; 
and (2) whether, under I.R.E. 403, the district court abused its discretion in finding the probative 
value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667 (citing State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670 (1999)). 
However, "evidence of a person's actions or conduct, other than that set forth as an ultimate 
issue for trial, is generally inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b)." State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 
119 (Ct. App. 1992) ( quoting State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 948, 950 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Determinations of relevancy involve an issue of law and are reviewed de nova. State v. Hairston, 
133 Idaho 496, 501(1999); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210,218 (Ct. App. 2009). 
1. The Evidence Was Not Relevant 
Evidence is only relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and 
that the defendant was the actor. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009) (citation omitted.). In 
order to make this determination, "the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence to establish the other crime or wrong as fact." 15 Id. (citations omitted.) "The trial court 
must then determine whether the other crime or wrong is relevant to a material and disputed 
issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity." Id. (citations omitted.) 
a. Relevance For A Non-Propensity Purpose 
"Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 404 (b) when 
15 The district court heard an offer of proof from each of the three women before allowing them to testify and 
impliedly found that there was sufficient evidence to establish the events as fact. (Tr.5/27 /11, p.348, L. I p.365, 
L.23.) Mr. Ehrlick does not challenge these findings in this appeal. 
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its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's 
propensity to engage in such behavior." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. 
In its Decision and Order on Pending Motions issued September 13, 2010, the Court 
ruled that the proffered IRE 404(b) evidence was relevant to show Mr. Ehrlick's sadistic 
intentions to inflict suffering on others. (S.R., pp.398-411.) The Court specifically noted that: 
This evidence would tend to show that Ehrlick has in the past acted with the intent 
of controlling and dominating others through the infliction of pain and suffering. 
Such evidence shares certain characteristics with the charged crime of murder by 
torture, particular! y the heinous nature of the acts, and the infliction of prolonged 
physical pain on others with whom Ehrlick shared a close relationship. This 
evidence tends to show that Ehrlick uses his size to inflict extreme and prolonged 
pain on people who are smaller and weaker than him. Because evidence of prior 
bad acts are admissible to show intent, and because courts have permitted limited 
evidence of prior bad acts in murder by torture cases, this Court finds that the 
following evidence will be admissible under 404(b) ... 
These incidents do more than just show a violent character trait, they tend to show 
a sadistic intent on Ehrlick's part to control the actions of and to inflict prolonged 
pain upon someone with whom he had control of and had a close relationship. 
They tend to show that Ehrlick had the intent to cause suffering on another in 
order to control her behavior. They also show Ehrlick uses his size to physically 
dominate smaller and weaker people. The Court in Stuart found almost identical 
evidence to be admissible to show intent in a murder by torture case. 110 Idaho 
163, 715 P.2d 833. 
This Court finds that acts allegedly perpetrated by Ehrlick . . . are 
egregious enough to show more than just a violent natured person. They show 
intent to inflict suffering or to satisfy sadistic intentions. 
Because evidence of Ehrlick's intent to inflict suffering or to satisfy 
sadistic intentions is highly relevant, such evidence overcomes any prejudicial 
effect it might have in terms of being admissible. The Court finds the probative 
value of this evidence is not outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice. 
(S.R., pp.402-404.) In ruling on the motion to reconsider, the district court expanded the 
reasoning for allowing the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence: 
The court believes that State v. Stuart is on point with this case, as it also 
involved a torture case, and State v. Stuart held that abuse of other individuals is 
relevant to show the sadistic nature of the defendant, for the defendant's intent to 
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torture, the defendant's motive; that elements of criminal conduct can be proved 
by prior bad acts for those purposes. 
In Ehrlick's case, the evidence of his prior relationships is relevant for the 
specific purpose of showing motive, sadistic intent, sadistic nature and his frame 
of mind at the time of the commission of the alleged acts directed toward [R.M.] 
Thus the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b ). The evidence is also 
admissible as to identity, it looks like, under State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772. In 
regards to probative versus prejudicial value, the court finds that the evidence is 
highly relevant. This is a circumstantial case. The probative value is not 
outweighed by - of unfair prejudice. The defendant will have the opportunity to 
present evidence by cross-examination or otherwise. And it appears, form what I 
have heard, the defendant is looking at also the possibility of an alternate 
perpetrator. All right, so the motion to reconsider is denied. 
(Tr.4/27/11, p.72, L.6 - p.73, L.4.) 
Contrary to the district court's ruling, the previous uncharged conduct was not relevant 
for any permissible I.RE. 404(b) purpose. 
Intent to torture is an element of first degree murder by torture which must be proven by 
the State. See generally State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 170 (1985) ( abrogated on other grounds 
by State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721 (1993). Intent is what distinguishes first and second degree 
torture murder. Tribe, 123 Idaho at 725-726. Commonly, the necessary intent for a torture 
murder case can be inferred from the circumstances of the crime, the nature of the killing, and 
the condition of the decedent's body. State v. Gonzales, 114 Ariz. 38, 43-44 (1974); People v. 
Cole, 95 P.3d 811, 849 (2004). 
In ruling that evidence of abuse against Ms. Burnett, Ms. Marshall, and Ms. Palmer 
would be admissible, this court relied primarily upon three cases. In State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 
163 (1986), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the district court's admission of evidence in a 
murder by torture case that the defendant abused other women and their minor children with 
whom he had lived. In State v. Rodriguez, 2005 WL 1785796 (Cal. App. 1 Dist), the California 
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appellate court upheld the district court's admission of evidence in a murder by torture case of 
several earlier violent assaults against people other than the victim. And, in State v. Pierce, 346 
N.C. 471 (1997), the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the district court's admission into 
evidence in a murder by torture case of the defendant's alleged mistreatment of another child. In 
each case, the defendant admitted he had committed the charged acts, but without either criminal 
intent or without an intent to torture. 
In Stuart, the defense was that Stuart's actions "only constituted an overabundance of 
discipline, without the intent to cause pain or suffering." Stuart, 110 Idaho at 170. Specifically, 
the defendant admitted that he caused the death of the boy by striking him and, at trial, defense 
counsel acknowledged Mr. Stuart's guilt, "arguing that it was not a murder, but manslaughter." 
Id at 184. The Supreme Court noted that "[t]he state's only chance to refute that defense, other 
than by showing the severity of the treatment of the victim, would be to introduce other evidence 
which might tend to show that appellant's treatment of this victim was for purposes other than 
discipline." Id. at 170. The Idaho State Supreme Court found the evidence was relevant to show 
that, "appellant had an intent other than that of discipline in his treatment of the victim because 
he treated other persons close to him in a similar manner. It was also relevant to show appellant's 
sadistic nature, thus supporting the state's theory that appellant's treatment of the victim was 
torture, inflicted to satisfy the sadistic inclinations of appellant." Id. The Supreme Court also 
cited the trial court's comments in weighing the evidence with approval. Id. at 171. The trial 
court noted that: 
[I]ntent is not clear at this time. If I felt the intent was overwhelmingly clear in 
either direction-in other words, that the Prosecutor had failed or had totally 
succeeded to demonstrate his case at this point I would probably be very hesitant 
to allow evidence of past behavior which will in fact be prejudicial to this case. 
Id. at 171. 
The district court read Stuart as allowing in the 404(b) evidence for intent related to the 
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discipline defense, sadistic nature (independent of the discipline defense), and motive. 
(Tr.4/27/11, p.62, L.23 - p.63, L. 15.) Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the district court's reading of 
Stuart is incorrect. The evidence was allowed in for two reasons: that the defendant had intent 
other than to discipline and to show sadistic nature. The Supreme Court reiterated that the 
evidence was admitted for the specific purposes of showing "sadistic intent and frame of mind of 
the appellant." Id. at 170. Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the pertinent facts for making the relevancy 
determination, Mr. Stuart's action of putting his intent at issue, was central to the ultimate 
holding of Stuart. The Supreme Court, at no point in the opinion, conducted any analysis stating 
unequivocally that the evidence was also let in to show sadistic nature devoid of Mr. Stuart's 
intent defense. To the contrary, the construction of the opinion shows that the relevancy 
determination was based solely upon the asserted defense. The two reasons provided are both 
contained in the same paragraph that begins with a review of Mr. Stuart's asserted defense and 
the effect of the assertion of such a defense upon the State's ability to prove their case without 
the admission of the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. As such, Mr. Ehrlick maintains that Stuart, like all 
of the other cases relied upon by the district court in determining the relevancy of the I.R.E 
404(b) evidence in his case, involves a unique circumstance - the defendant specifically putting 
his intent at issue. 
In Rodriguez, the appellate court noted that "[ d]efendant's intent at the time of the fatal 
beating was the only disputed issue at trial." Rodriguez, 2005 WL 1785796 at 4. In that case, the 
defense had conceded Rodriguez beat the victim, but argued that he lacked a sadistic intent. Id. 
The court noted that Rodriguez involved a question of intent and, in such cases, evidence of other 
crimes is admissible to prove the defendant acted with the requisite tortuous intent. Id. at 5. 
Similarly, in Pierce the defendant admitted to shaking the child victim but claimed only 
to have shaken her to revive her. Pierce, 346 N.C. at 490. The appellate court held "[t]he 
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testimony that defendant shook and threw a four-year-old boy on a prior occasion is sufficiently 
similar to defendant's conduct in this case to contradict the suggestion that defendant inflicted 
Tabitha's injuries while attempting to revive her." Id. 
Unlike these cases, the issue of intent was not challenged by Mr. Ehrlick. Intent must be 
at issue before evidence of other crimes is relevant. State v. Roach, l 09 Idaho 973, 974 (Ct. App. 
1985); State v. 1\1atthews, l 08 Idaho 482 (Ct. App. 1985). In State v. Stoddard, l 05 Idaho 533, 
536-38 (Ct. App. 1983), the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that it was error for the district 
court to admit evidence of a prior theft under the theory it was relevant and necessary to prove 
intent to steal. Stoddard was tried for stealing a car and the state introduced Rule 404(b) evidence 
of a previous car theft by Stoddard to show his intent. Id. at 535-36. The Court of Appeals, in 
finding error, stated that "[t]here was ample evidence from which Stoddard's criminal intent 
could have been determined, without the necessity of introducing highly prejudicial evidence 
that he had been charged with stealing another car a week earlier." Id. at 538. Therefore, in cases 
where the intent needed to convict can be manifested by the circumstances attending the act, 
404(b) evidence is inadmissible as it is unnecessary to prove intent and, as such, is not relevant. 
Intent is not always sufficiently at issue in a specific intent crime so as to justify the 
admission of prior bad acts evidence. Roach, l 09 Idaho at 97 4-75. In Roach the defendant was 
accused of lewd conduct with a 14-year-old disabled boy. Id. at 974. The trial court allowed in 
evidence of sexual misconduct with the victim's mother under the intent, and common scheme or 
plan exceptions, to the general rule excluding evidence of other crimes or bad acts. Id. at 973-74. 
The Court of Appeals noted that, "if we were to conclude that intent is always at issue in a trial 
for a charged specific intent crime, then other crime evidence would always be admissible, 
subject, of course, to the balancing process. We do not believe the intent exception goes that far." 
Id. at 975. The Court held that intent was not sufficiently at issue because the defendant 
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contended that he did not commit the act in question, not that he had committed the acts with an 
innocent intent or mental defect, nor did he present an alibi defense. Id. Ultimately, the appellate 
court ruled that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of sexual misconduct with the victim's 
mother. Id. 
In State v. Brummett, 150 Idaho 339 (Ct. App. 2010), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
reaffirmed the holding that the defense raised in a particular case is of the upmost importance in 
determining the admissibility of I.R.E. 404(b) intent evidence. In Brummett, the defendant was 
charged with the burglary of a Shopko store and at trial the State was permitted to introduce 
evidence of prior thefts at other Shopko stores. Id at 341. Mr. Brummett's defense was that he 
did not have the intent to commit a theft upon his entry to the store; he admitted to taking items 
and specifically argued that he was only disputing the intent element. Id at 343. On appeal, the 
court distinguished the facts in Brummett from Roach, noting that Brummett put his intent upon 
entering the store squarely at issue and held that "because Brummett admitted to the act of theft 
and because burglary is a specific intent crime and Brummett 's intent was squarely at issue, the 
evidence of his prior thefts from other area Shopko stores was relevant." Id. (emphasis added). 
The defense in the present case was that Mr. Ehrlick did not commit the crime with 
which he was charged. As such, the case at hand is similar to Roach in that Mr. Ehrlick's defense 
was only that he did not commit the crimes charged, not that he did commit the crimes but with 
an innocent intent. Therefore, his intent was not squarely at issue in the same way as it was in the 
cases relied upon by the State and district court. For this reason, the evidence was not relevant to 
show intent. 16 
Further, this Court should resolve that Stuart did not hold that I.R.E. 404(b) evidence 
16 Mr. Ehrlick notes that the exclusion of the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence does not unduly limit the State's ability to 
attempt to prove that Mr. Ehrlick was the perpetrator. It simply reduces the chance of unfair prejudice and forces the 
State to prove the case through the condition of the body and other similar means. 
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offered to show the requisite tortuous intent is always relevant to show a sadistic nature in a 
torture murder case. In analyzing the case at hand, the district court treated the I.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence differently than it would have for other crimes, in effect making a special 404(b) 
admissibility rule for first degree torture murder cases. This "special rule" is the same kind of 
disparate treatment that this Court condemned in Grist. 
Grist held that there is no general exception to I.R.E. 404(b) for distinct types of crimes. 
(See generally Grist, 147 Idaho 49 (holding that I.R.E. 404(b) applies in the same way for cases 
involving sexual crimes as it does for all other crimes)). It was surely not the intent of the 
drafters of I.R.E. 404(b) to create an exception that the Rules of Evidence are different in a 
torture murder case; that Rule 404(b) simply does not apply in such cases ( or, at least, is 
significantly altered). Indeed, if that were the case, the drafters would have written into the rule 
an exception for torture murder cases. Besides being unsupportable as a practical matter, a 
possible blanket exception to Rule 404(b) for torture murder cases is troubling because it has the 
effect of singling out a certain class of defendants and making their convictions easier to obtain. 
It may well result in the charging of torture murder as apposed to other first degree murder 
charges simply because character evidence would be admissible which otherwise may not be 
relevant. Because no specific I.R.E. 404(b) exception has been created to allow for the 
admittance of otherwise inadmissible evidence in a torture murder case, the evidence at issue, in 
the case at hand, could not have been admitted pursuant to such a special exception. 
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the State failed to prove that the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, related to 
the three former girlfriends, actually showed that he acted with a tortuous intent and, as a result, 
that the requisite relationship between the prior conduct and the criminal allegations existed. The 
only evidence offered to show that Mr. Ehrlick had acted with a tortuous intent or sadistic nature 
when abusing the women was as follows: Misty Barnett believed that Mr. Ehrlick took pleasure 
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in abusing her because he had "an evil look on his face" when the abuse occurred. (Tr., p.2821, 
Ls.5-10.) Kelly Marshall believed that Mr. Ehrlick took pleasure in causing her pain because he 
never apologized or had any remorse. (Tr., p.2840, L.20 - p.2841, L.2, p.2850, Ls.9-12.) Alexis 
Palmer also believed that Mr. Ehrlick enjoyed "being mean" because he would never apologize 
and would "smirk." (Tr., p.2878, Ls.3-23.) Mr. Ehrlick maintains that the abuse of the former 
girlfriends is classic domestic violence behavior and that having an evil look on one's face, 
failing to apologize, or "smirking" does not elevate the abuse to the same type of actions 
required for the sadistic nature required in a torture murder case. 
Instead, Mr. Ehrlick contends that this evidence is only relevant to show only that has a 
bad character for violence, an impermissible purpose. The evidence's admission was sought 
specifically to show that once a violent or, for the sake of argument, sadistic and tortuous person, 
always a violent, or sadistic and tortuous person; that a leopard does not change his spots. This is 
the same scenario involving sexual abuse and burglary, simply the evidence of prior bad acts, 
when no defense opens the door to its admission, has long been found to be inadmissible as 
propensity evidence. Similarly, use of evidence of this physically violent disposition carries the 
danger of becoming a vehicle for the admission of evidence related solely to the accused's 
propensity to commit such acts. 
It is a fundamental tenet of the American legal system that a defendant may only be 
convicted based upon proof that he committed the crime with which he is charged, and not based 
upon poor character. State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1994). Evidence of 
misconduct not charged in an underlying offense may have an unjust influence on the jurors and 
may lead them to determine guilt based upon either: (1) a presumption that if the defendant did 
it before, he must have done it this time; or (2) an opinion that it does not really matter whether 
the defendant committed the charged crime because he deserves to be punished anyhow for other 
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bad acts. Id. at 244-45. "The prejudicial effect of [ character evidence] is that it induces the jury 
to believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a man of 
criminal character." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 (1978)). 
Therefore, I.R.E. 404 precludes the use of character evidence or other misconduct evidence to 
imply that the defendant must have acted consistently with those past acts or traits. Id. As such, 
the 404(b) evidence in the case at hand, which amounts to impermissible character evidence, was 
improperly admitted. 
11. Motive 
Mr. Ehrlick was charged with first degree torture murder by means of intentionally 
inflicting upon R.M. "extreme and prolonged pain with the intent to cause suffering, and/or by 
inflicting . . . extreme and prolonged acts of brutality with the intent to cause suffering, to 
execute vengeance or to satisfy some sadistic inclination ... " (R., p.633.) In the present case, 
the motive for inflicting the alleged torture is intertwined with the intent exception. As such, 
Mr. Ehrlick incorporates the arguments that the evidence was not relevant to show intent as 
support for the argument that any physical violence inflicted with the intent to torture for any of 
the charged purposes was also improperly admitted. Further, the State did not provide any 
distinct (not related to intent) information regarding the motive for the abuse of the former 
girlfriends and, as such, failed to show that the abuse of these women in anyway showed that 
Mr. Ehrlick was acting with the same tortuous motive in allegedly abusing R.M. 
111. Identity 
The district court allowed the evidence in to show identity under the holding of State v. 
Porter, 130 Idaho 772 (1997). In Porter, a murder case, the issue at trial was the identity of the 
killer. Id. At trial, the district court allowed the testimony of three former girlfriends that 
Mr. Porter had engaged in a pattern of behavior that was consistent with the manner in which the 
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victim was killed. Id. at 782. While the district court found that most of the proffered evidence 
was "typical of a wife beating or a battery by a man upon a woman," and, therefore, not relevant 
to establish a pattern of behavior and inadmissible, it allowed the admission of limited testimony 
regarding instances of hair-pulling, and necessary circumstances surrounding the hair-pulling, as 
evidence that was probative to identity. Id. at 783. In making this decision, the district court 
heard testimony that it was "unusual for the victim of a battery to lose as much hair as Jones had 
lost and that it was unusual for a man who was beating a woman to deliberately pull out the 
woman's hair." Id. at 784. On review, the Idaho State Supreme Court found that "evidence of 
prior misconduct is admissible if it establishes a distinct, though not completely unique, method 
or pattern of behavior." Id. The Court concluded that, "[a]fter examining the testimony of the 
two law enforcement officers and the attorney general's investigator regarding their collective 
experiences investigating batteries and analyzing the three former girlfriends' testimony before 
the jury, we hold that the evidence of prior misconduct indeed was relevant to the issue of the 
identity of Jones' killer." Id. 
The case at hand is clearly distinguishable and Mr. Ehrlick maintains that the evidence 
should not have been admitted to show identity. Unlike in Porter, the evidence offered by the 
former girlfriends in Mr. Ehrlick's case was not sufficiently distinctive to form a modus 
operandi. The testimony showed that Mr. Ehrlick had engaged in choking, hair-pulling, name-
calling, and restricting the ability of the women to leave the home. (Tr., p.2875, L.5 - p.2880, 
L.3, p.2839, L.21 - p.2845, L.19, p.2813, L. 1 - p.2820, L.11.) This behavior is routine behavior 
in a relationship involving domestic violence. There are no distinct characteristics that point to 
any individual's identity and, moreover, specifically none that point to Mr. Ehrlick as the person 
who murdered R.M. Additionally, there is no evidence that Mr. Ehrlick ever choked R.M. or 
pulled his hair, proving the opposite of identity - that if the same person committed the prior acts 
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and the murder, they acted outside of testified to modus operandi. Therefore, the evidence does 
not establish the required "distinct, though not completely unique, method or pattern of 
behavior" and, as such, is not admissible under the I.R.E. 404(b) exception. 
1v. Common Plan Or Scheme 
The I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was not admitted by the district court for showing a common 
plan or scheme. Mr. Ehrlick contends on appeal that this was con-ect and that the evidence could 
not be admitted for this purpose. 
v. Opportunity, Preparation, Plan, Knowledge, And Absence Of 
Mistake 
The district court did not allow the I.R.E. 404(b) evidence related to the former 
girlfriends under any of the above exceptions. Mr. Ehrlick asse1is that this was con-ect and that 
the evidence could not be admitted for any of the above purposes. Simply, abuse of former 
girlfriends, as much as twenty years prior, could not show that such abuse created the 
opportunity to abuse R.M. There is no information that such past abuse was in preparation for or 
part of a plan to abuse R.M., a child who has not been born when some of the abuse was 
committed. Similarly, the past abuse could not be used to show that the abuse of former 
girlfriends proved any element of knowledge or absence of mistake. Further, Mr. Ehrlick raised 
no defenses that could implicate any of the above exceptions. As such, the evidence could not be 
admitted under any of the above exceptions. 
In sum, the evidence that Mr. Ehrlick had abused prior girlfriends was not relevant for 
any I.R.E. 404(b) purpose to prove conduct with R.M. Not being relevant, the evidence should 
have been excluded without reaching the balancing of probative value against unfair prejudicial 
effect. 
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2. Assuming Arguendo The Proffered Evidence Was Relevant, The Court Abused 
Its Discretion Because The Evidence Was More Prejudicial Than Probative 
Finally, even if relevant, the evidence should have been excluded under I.R.E. 403. 
Relevant evidence can be excluded by the district court if the probative value of that evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 254 
(1995). The question is whether the prejudice is unfair; whether it harms the defendant because it 
is so inflammatory that it would lead the jury to convict regardless of other facts presented. State 
v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989). 
While the district court's calculus of whether the probative value of evidence is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, this discretion is 
not without limits. As noted by the court in Stoddard: 
This is not a discretion to depart from the principle that evidence of other crimes, 
having no substantial relevancy except to ground the inference that [the] accused 
is a bad man and hence probably committed the crime, must be excluded. The 
leeway of discretion lies rather in the opposite direction, empowering the judge to 
exclude other-crimes evidence, even when it has substantial independent 
relevancy, if in his judgment its probative value for this purpose is outweighed by 
the danger that it will stir such passion in the jury as to sweep them beyond a 
rational consideration of guilt or innocence of the crime on trial. Discretion 
implies not only leeway but responsibility. A decision clearly wrong on this 
question of balancing probative value against danger of prejudice will be 
corrected on appeal as an abuse of discretion. 
Stoddard, l 05 Idaho at 53 7 ( quoting McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LA w ON EVIDENCE § 190 
(Cleary ed. 1972). 
Prior physical abuse evidence is indeed highly prejudicial. As Justice Bistline wrote in his 
dissent in Stuart: 
Counsel for defendant's assessment of the admission of such evidence is: "Clearly 
any small amount of probative value that the testimonies of Dally, Jacobson, and 
Nelson had to the crime with which Gene Stuart is charged, is far outweighed by 
the enormous prejudice that such testimony engendered against the defendant." I 
agree, adding only that such is an understatement. The senseless killing of a three-
year-old boy would have in the first placed engendered as much jury antipathy 
toward the defendant as the prosecutor could have wanted. To "try" the defendant 
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at the same time for uncharged bad conduct, whether criminal or not, makes it 
impossible to conclude that the jury might have convicted the defendant without 
having heard evidence unrelated to the alleged crime of torture murder. 
Stuart, 110 Idaho at 201 (Bistline, J., dissenting). 
In this case, even assuming that the evidence is relevant, it was highly prejudicial. 
Mr. Ehrlick was facing a jury that was already dealing with a highly sensitive subject matter. 
Evidence that he was a violent man of bad character could have easily led the jury to convict in a 
close case where the evidence was purely circumstantial. The evidence presented by one of these 
women was not just that he was abusive, but that Mr. Ehr lick was such a horrible person that she 
would rather end her life than be with him any longer. Such a statement is especially 
inflammatory. 
In sum, the jury was presented with evidence that could have easily overwhelmed them; 
undoubtedly, they jurors considered Mr. Ehrlick to be a man of bad character. In a case where 
the danger of unfair prejudice is very high, and the jury heard multiple witnesses describe 
uncharged conduct, the district court abused its discretion by failing to exclude the evidence 
pursuant to I.R.E. 403. 
C. The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error Was Harmless 
Because the district court's erroneous ruling was preserved by a timely objection, the 
State bears the burden of proving the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Additional 
harmless error arguments and authority can be found in section I(C) and is incorporated herein 
by reference. The State cannot show that the error was not harmless. This is especially true in 
light of the way the jury was instructed regarding the admission of this I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. 
There was no limiting instruction given contemporaneously with the testimony. Instead, only a 
single instruction was given at the close of evidence. (R., p.1212.) This instruction was very 
general and did not properly limit the ways in which the jury could consider the evidence, 
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instructing on all I.RE. 404(b) purposes not just the limited exceptions under which the evidence 
was admitted. Based upon the instruction given, it cannot be known if the jury considered the 
evidence for proper purposes or improper purposes. 17 The State simply can not show the error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
IV. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Granted The State's Second Motion In Limine 
Regarding The Presentation Of Evidence Of Mr. Ehrlick's Alleged Attempt To Alter And/Or 
Influence Testimony Of Ms. Jenkins 
A. Relevant Factual Information 
The State filed a motion in limine requesting that it be allowed to present information 
that, on two occasions, Mr. Ehrlick had "attempted to influence, affect, and/or alter the testimony 
of Defendant Melissa Jenkins, a potential witness in his trial." (S.R., pp.182-196.) The State 
asserted that a letter drafted by Mr. Ehrlick, given to his niece, Robbyn Ehrlick, was meant to be 
sent to Ms. Jenkins. (S.R., pp.183-186.) The letter accuses Ms. Jenkins of lying about 
Mr. Ehrlick, expresses his emotional distress, states that he cares about the kids and was never 
abusive, continues that he did nothing wrong, alleges that officers have been lying to her, and 
states that Ms. Jenkins' family is betraying her. (S.R., p.186.) The State claimed that, "the letter 
to Defendant Jenkins is an attempt to convince her that he was not involved in the murder of 
R.M. and that others are providing her with bad information, and to thereby sway her testimony 
in the event that she is called to testify against him." (S.R., p.186.) 
The State also sought to present evidence that Mr. Ehrlick had attempted to contact 
Ms. Jenkins on July 30, 2009, following Ms. Jenkins statements to officers which implicated 
Mr. Ehrlick in the physical abuse of R.M. (S.R., pp.186-188.) Mr. Ehrlick had been made aware 
17 Mr. Ehrlick does not raise the failure to properly instruct the jury as a separate issue as there was no objection to 
the improper jury instruction. However, he asserts that the improper instruction can be considered in evaluating the 
harm of the erroneous admission of the testimony regardless of the failure by defense counsel to object. 
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that Ms. Jenkins had made such statements during his own questioning. (S.R., p.187.) In these 
phone calls, Mr. Ehrlick asked Ms. Jenkins to contact him, told her he loved her, asked about 
what was going on, questioned why Ms. Jenkins would "do this to me", and reiterated that he 
had not harmed R.M. (S.R., p.187.) The State asserted that these messages and attempts to 
contact Ms. Jenkins, "were undoubtedly an attempt to contact Defendant Jenkins and dissuade 
her from continuing to provide law enforcement information about [R.M.] 's disappearance and 
Ehrlick's physical violence to [R.M.] prior to his death and disappearance." (S.R., pp.187-188.) 
Mr. Ehrlick opposed the motion in limine asserting that, "the letter and phone calls do not 
even rise to the level of relevance in this case because of their equivocal nature" and challenged 
that the prejudicial value of the evidence was outweighed by the prejudicial effect. 
(S.R., pp.360-361.) 
Ultimately, the district court held that: 
Even though Ehrlick does not make an explicit attempt to influence Jenkins, the 
court finds that in the context in which the State intends to offer it, it can be 
construed as an attempt to influence a witness, which is admissible 404(b) 
evidence to show consciousness of guilt. State v. Rolfe, 92 Idaho 467, 470 (1968); 
State v. Pokorney, 2010 WL 2105078 (Id.Ct.App.2010)[.] 
The court finds this evidence is highly relevant and it is not unduly 
prejudicial. The evidence can also be interpreted to be that of an innocent man 
trying to clear himself. 
The court grants the motion. 
(S.R., p.409.) 
B. The Evidence Was Not Admissible As It Was Not Relevant 
The applicable jurisprudence of questions of admissibility of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was 
articulated in Section III(B) above and is incorporated herein by reference. Mr. Ehrlick asserts 
that the district court erred in finding that the above evidence was relevant. I.R.E. 404(b) allows 
evidence of prior acts if admitted for the purpose of showing knowledge or consciousness of 
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guilt. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,279 (2003). Evidence of a defendant's efforts to influence 
or affect evidence, such as intimidating a witness, attempting to procure or fabricate false 
evidence, destruction, or concealment of evidence may be relevant to demonstrate consciousness 
of guilt. Id; State v. Rolfe, 92 Idaho 467, 470 (1968); State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 463-65 
(2010). The existence of alternative, more innocent, explanations generally goes to the weight, 
not the admissibility, of the evidence. State v. Rossignol, 14 7 Idaho 818, 823 (Ct. App. 2009); 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 279; Pokorney, 149 Idaho at 465. Mr. Ehrlick asserts that unlike in the 
above referenced cases the evidence in his case, the letter and phone calls, do not even rise to the 
level of being relevant evidence because the apparent and most obvious meaning does not 
implicate a guilty conscious. 
In Rolfe, a case involving statutory rape, defense counsel objected to the trial court's 
admittance of testimony that the defendant had offered money to a witness to testify that the 
witness had taken the victim home on the night of the alleged crime. Rolfe, 92 Idaho at 470. The 
Supreme Court found no error and held that such evidence was admissible as evidence of 
consciousness of guilt. Id. 
Similarly, in Sheahan, the district court allowed testimony that despite directions to leave 
bags on his hands, the defendant removed them, and when later replaced on his hands, he poked 
his fingers through the bags. Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280. Mr. Sheahan agued that the evidence 
was not relevant because he did not dispute that he had shot the victim; however, the court 
determined that "an inference could be drawn" that Mr. Sheanan was trying to destroy evidence. 
Id. 
In Pokorney, the defendant wrote a letter to his son about odd sexual information. 
Pokorney, 149 Idaho at 464. It was reasonably inferred from this letter that the defendant wanted 
his son to believe that his prior sexual act was not wrongful but natural and that the 
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criminalization of sex acts is wrong. Id. While Mr. Pokorney "did not make an explicit attempt to 
influence evidence," "a fair interpretation identified that as its intended purpose." Id. at 465. The 
letter was found to be inadmissible, however, because the probative value did not outweigh the 
prejudicial effect. Id. at 465-66. 
In Rossignol, following his conviction for various sex crimes, the defendant asserted on 
appeal that it was error for the trial court to have admitted evidence of his flight. Rossignol, 14 7 
Idaho at 823. Although Mr. Rossignol asserted that the circumstances surrounding his departure 
from the jurisdiction did not clearly point to one particular reason, the district court determined 
that it was objectively reasonable to conclude that it was the convergence of events related to the 
sex charges that gave rise to the flight. Id. The Court of Appeals agreed and found that the 
evidence was relevant to show consciousness of guilt. Id. at 823. Other cases relied upon by the 
State in the motion also involved conduct by a defendant that could be easily and unmistakably 
interpreted as an action by the defendant illustrating a guilty conscious. See generally US. v. 
Maricle, 2010 WL 2790806 *5 (E.D.Ky 2010); US. v. Schrage, 2008 WL 4977589 *4 
(N.D.Iowa 2008); State v. Baker, 237 Mont 140, 147-48 (1989). 
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the evidence the State sought to introduce is markedly different 
than the evidence found to be admissible in the cases above. The phone messages and letter, 
when taken at face value, do not imply a guilty conscious. The plain meaning of the words used 
by Mr. Ehrlick convey "an innocent man trying to clear himself." (S.R., p.409.) The district 
court recognized that the evidence could be interpreted as quoted above and recognized that 
Mr. Ehrlick did "not make any explicit attempt to influence Jenkins." (S.R., p.409.) Unlike in 
the cases above, where the evidence's most reasonable interpretation shows consciousness of 
guilt, in the case at hand, the evidence does not clearly lend itself to the same reasonable 
interpretation. In order to give Mr. Ehrlick's statements a nefarious interpretation, one must 
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assume that he is speaking in code to Ms. Jenkins, that Ms. Jenkins was telling the truth in her 
statements to police, that Mr. Ehrlick had been lying to police, that Mr. Ehrlick thought 
Ms. Jenkins would understand his coded messages, and that she would interpret the messages as 
an attempt to alter her behavior or encourage her to make different statements. When viewing the 
evidence, it is only if one assumes that Mr. Ehrlick is guilty that any nefarious reading is even 
possible. It was erroneous to speculate that the letters and phone messages were sending a 
message with the intent of altering Ms. Jenkins' testimony. 
While the above case law suggests that alternate interpretations and explanations of 
evidence go to weight, not admissibility, the cases also seem to suggest that the most reasonable 
interpretation must show consciousness of guilt and, only then, any potential less feasible 
explanations go to weight. Mr. Ehrlick's case presents the opposite situation; the evidence does 
not show consciousness of guilt or, taken in the light least favorably to Mr. Ehrlick, the evidence 
is ambiguous and, therefore, does not meet the threshold requirement presented in the relevant 
case law. Because the evidence's obvious interpretation does not show a consciousness of guilt, 
the evidence sought to be offered does not rise to the level of relevance under I.R.E. 401 or the 
cases relied upon by the State. As such, it is not relevant and its admittance was erroneous. 18 
C. The Probative Value Is Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice 
Ambiguous evidence or evidence which fails to prove what it is being offered for has 
very limited to no probative value. Mr. Ehrlick maintains that the above evidence is not relevant 
because it does not show a consciousness of guilt, the purpose for which it was admitted. 
However, assuming arguendo that the evidence was relevant, its prejudicial effect outweighs any 
limited probative value. See I.R.E. 403. 
18 If this Court finds that the admission of the evidence at issue was erroneous, Mr. Ehrlick asserts that that the 
granting of the State's Motion to Take Judicial Notice of the State's Motion to Compel Testimony of Melissa 
Jenkins was also error, as the timing of the motion to compel would no longer be relevant. 
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As noted above, the evidence has little to no probative value. However, there is a danger 
of prejudice to Mr. Ehrlick as the tone of the letter and messages portray Mr. Ehrlick in an 
unfavorable light, showing a personality and style that is inherently unlikeable to a jury, and 
places the jury in a position where they are asked to look at the case is a more emotional way. As 
noted above, the messages and letter only implicate a consciousness of guilt if the jury makes 
several unproven and necessary assumptions. Because Mr. Ehrlick' s guilt or innocence is the 
ultimate question, there is a grave danger in asking the jury to consider the evidence for the 
limited purpose of consciousness of guilt when the only way they can do that is to first assume 
Mr. Ehrlick is guilty. As such, Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the district court abused its discretion in 
admitting the evidence because the evidence's prejudicial effect outweighs any potential 
probative value. 
D. The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error Was Harmless 
Because the district court's erroneous ruling was preserved by a timely objection, the 
State bears the burden of proving the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Additional 
harmless error argument and authority can be found in section I(C) and are incorporated herein 
by reference. The State cannot show the error was harmless in this case. This is especially true in 
light of the way the jury was instructed regarding the admission of all I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. 
There was no limiting instruction given contemporaneously with the admission of the exhibits. 
Instead, only a single instruction was given at the close of evidence. (R., p.1212.) This 
instruction was very general and did not properly limit the ways in which the jury could consider 
the evidence, instructing on all I.RE. 404(b) purposes not just the limited exceptions under 
which this evidence was admitted. Based upon the instruction given, it cannot be known if the 
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jury considered the evidence for proper purposes or improper purposes. 19 
Furthermore, the error was exacerbated by testimony from Detective Mark Ayotte who 
was allowed to testify regarding Mr. Ehrlick's attempts to contact Ms. Jenkins. (Tr., p.4229, L.7 
- 4232, L.18.) The State also highlighted this issue in closing arguments, noting that Mr. Ehrlick 
was trying to control Ms. Jenkins and that the jury should consider this as behavior that was 
inconsistent with innocence. (Tr., p.6269, Ls.2-16.) This additional testimony and the 
mentioning of this evidence in closing argument further increased the prejudicial effect of 
allowing the presentation of this evidence. As such, the State can not prove the error was 
harmless. 
V. 
The District Court Erred In Granting The State's Motion In Limine Regarding The Presentation 
Of Evidence Of Mr. Ehrlick's Emergency Room Visit On July 31, 2009 
A. Relevant Factual Information 
The State sought to introduce evidence related to Mr. Ehrlick's emergency room visit the 
week following the disappearance of R.M. (S.R., pp.412-423.) The district court summarized the 
facts, as asserted by the State, related to the motion as follows: 
On July 30, 2009, Ehrlick was starting to crack under the pressure of a 
police investigation into the disappearance of [R.M.] During an interview on July 
30, Ehrlick admitted to having lied to police about not using corporal punishment 
on [R.M.]. At the end of this interview, the State claims that Ehrlick promised to 
return the next day to tell investigators "the truth" about what happened with 
[R.M.]. Ehrlick spent the night of July 30 at Tricia's, the sister of co defendant 
Melissa Jenkins. While at Tricia's house Ehrlick learned the police were serving a 
search warrant at his apartment, allegedly upsetting Ehrlick and in response he 
stayed outside drinking. On the morning of July 31, 2009, Tricia tried to wake 
Ehrlick to drive him to the police station but discovered that he "seemed sleepy." 
The State also notes that a bottle of Ehrlick's medicine containing 
Lorazepam/Ativan pills was empty when it should have contained approximately 
eighty (80) one (1) milligram pills. While en route to the police station, Tricia 
19 Mr. Ehrlick does not raise the failure to properly instruct the jury as a separate issue as there was no objection to 
the improper jury instruction. However, he asserts that the improper instruction can be considered in evaluating the 
harm of the erroneous admission of the testimony regardless of the failure by defense counsel to object. 
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called Det. Brechwald and told him she believed Ehrlick had overdosed. The 
Detective directed them to come to the closest law enforcement building as Boise 
Fire Department employees were on site. He also contacted dispatch to have 
paramedics sent to that location. On arrival Ehrlick was seen by paramedics and 
transported to St. Alphonsus hospital. An officer rode in the ambulance with 
Ehrlick in case Ehrlick made a dying declaration. All officers were instructed not 
to question Ehrlick under any circumstances. At the hospital the emergency room 
doctor concluded the alleged overdose was not life threatening and that Ehrlick 
would likely be sleepy for some time. Based on that information, all officers left 
the hospital. After about an hour and a half the officers were advised that Ehrlick 
had made a full recovery but had taken a phone call, became enraged, combative, 
and threw his cell phone at a wall causing the hospital to put an emergency hold 
on him based on their belief he was a threat to himself or others. Officers returned 
to the hospital and transported him to Intermountain Hospital for a twenty-four 
(24) hour hold. 
(R., pp.807-808.) 
The State asserted that it planned to present evidence that the alleged overdose was not an 
overdose at all, but an attempt by Mr. Ehrlick to divert attention away from himself though a 
fake suicide attempt. (S.R., p.417.) They asserted that the evidence was relevant to show 
Mr. Ehrlick's "plan to attempt to control and direct the investigation", state of mind, 
consciousness of guilt, and intent. (S.R., pp.412-423.) They also argued that the fake suicide 
evidence was direct evidence as related to Count II. (S.R., p.420; Tr., p.462, Ls.7-25.) In support 
of the motion, the State submitted several police reports and reports from medical staff. (S.R., 
pp.661-679.) At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued that there was no suicide 
attempt, real or fake, that the evidence was not relevant and that the presentation of the evidence 
would amount to an infringement upon Mr. Ehrlick's Fifth Amendment rights. (Tr., p.439, L.13 
- p.442, L.19.) 
Ultimately, the district court found that the jury could find that Mr. Ehrlick had attempted 
suicide, that it was diversionary tactic, relevant to his state of mind and intent, that it was direct 
evidence to support Count II. (R., p.809.) The court noted that, "[h]is suicide attempt is unusual 
behavior for an innocent person" and tends to exhibit consciousness of guilt. (R., pp.809-810.) 
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The district court also noted that the evidence was being admitted to show Mr. Ehrlick's 
attempted suicide, not to "directly show an admission of guilt in his involvement in the murder" 
and; therefore, its admission does not implicate his right to remain silent. (R., p.810.) 
B. The Court Erred In Admitting The Evidence 
The applicable jurisprudence of questions of admissibility of I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was 
articulated in section III(B) above and is incorporated herein by reference. Mr. Ehrlick asserts 
that there are several errors in the district court's ruling. First, he asserts that it was erroneous to 
determine that there was an attempted suicide, as there was no evidence provided to support this 
finding. He also asserts that the evidence is not relevant as the State failed to prove that it was a 
fake suicide attempt and, as such, the evidence could not be relevant to show any of the offered 
I.R.E. 404(b) exceptions. Further, the evidence is not direct evidence relevant to Count II as it 
does not make the commission of the crime anymore likely. Additionally, that evidence offered 
to show that the "fake suicide" was a tactic to delay talking with police, as expected that 
morning, is a violation of Mr. Ehrlick's Fifth Amendment rights. Finally, that if the evidence has 
any limited probative value it is outweighed by the prejudicial effect. 
1. The District Court Erred In Finding That There Was An Actual Suicide Attempt 
The district court's holding that there was an actual attempted suicide was not supported 
by the evidence. The State took the position that there was not an attempted suicide, but a fake 
attempted suicide. (S.R., p.417.) Mr. Ehrlick has always adamantly maintained that there was no 
suicide attempt, fake or actual. (S.R., pp.676-678.) It was represented to the district court that 
the medical professionals involved did not believe that Mr. Ehrlick had overdosed. (Tr., p.468, 
Ls.17-24.) The medical reports submitted as a supplement to the motion noted that Mr. Ehrlick 
was sleepy, but did respond to select questions and within a couple of hours was much more 
alert. (S.R., pp.677-678.) Mr. Ehrlick informed medical professionals that he had not attempted 
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to commit suicide. (S.R., pp.676-678.) Although the district court was not presented with the 
following information, at trial, Dr. Barnes testified that while Mr. Ehrlick may have taken more 
of his prescriptions than was prescribed, there was no evidence that he had consumed a life-
threatening amount. (Tr., p.5472, L.21 - p.5474, L.3.) In summary, there was no evidence 
supplied to the district court that Mr. Ehrlick had actually attempted suicide. As such, the district 
court's finding that Mr. Ehrlick had actually attempted suicide is clearly erroneous. 
The district court's ruling is based entirely upon the finding that Mr. Ehrlick had actually 
attempted suicide. (R., pp.809-810.) Because the ruling is based upon factual information 
disproven by the record, the district court's entire ruling on the State's motion is erroneous. The 
logic applied by the district court is not longer useful in making a relevancy determination. For 
example, the district found that a "suicide attempt is unusual behavior for an innocent person." 
(R., p.809.) While Mr. Ehrlick agrees this may be a true statement, because there is no evidence 
that Mr. Ehrlick actually attempted to commit suicide, the court's analysis is not helpful in 
determining relevance. This holds true for the entirety of the district courts analysis. As such, this 
Court must find that the district court's ruling that the evidence is relevant was error. 
2. The Evidence Is Not Relevant As It Does Not Show Mr. Ehrick Faked A Suicide 
Attempt 
Although the district court did not determine that there was any evidence of a fake 
suicide attempt as argued by the State, Mr. Ehrlick maintains that evidence shows there was no 
suicide attempt, fake or otherwise. He asserts that because there was no fake suicide attempt the 
evidence the State sought to present has no relevance. 
The State has argued that Mr. Ehrlick faked an attempted suicide. (S.R., pp.412-423.) 
The State presented evidence that on July 31, 2009, Mr. Ehrlick was dropped of at the police 
station by Ms. Jenkins' sister who was concerned that Mr. Ehrlick had attempted suicide because 
he was hard to awaken and she had discovered an empty prescription medication bottle 
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belonging to Mr. Ehrlick. (S.R., p.416.) However, Ms. Jenkins' sister was not concerned enough 
to call an ambulance or take Mr. Ehrlick to the emergency room. (S.R., p.676.) Evidently, the 
officers whom she contacted were not highly concerned about the situation either, as they asked 
her to drop Mr. Ehrlick off at the police station. (S.R., p.676.) While paramedics evaluated Mr. 
Ehrlick, he was alert to verbal stimuli and walked over to the gurney for transport to the hospital. 
(S.R., p.668.) Immediately upon arrival, Mr. Ehrlick was sleepy and selective in answering 
questions. (S.R., p.676.) However, he would awaken at verbal commands, was oriented to place 
and time, stated he was only taking medication to get some sleep, denied taking a large amount 
of pills, and denied any suicide attempt. (S.R., p.676.) Mr. Ehrlick continually and emphatically 
denied to all hospital workers that he had attempted suicide. (S.R., pp.676-678.) 
In reality, Mr. Ehrlick had not been sleeping much in the week smce R.M.'s 
disappearance and that is why he had been prescribed the Lorazepam, a medication used to treat 
anxiety and insomnia. (Tr., p.5485, Ls.17-19.) He asserts that it is reasonable to believe that he 
was exhausted, had taken his prescribed medications and, with the assistance of the medication, 
was finally sleeping, and remained sleepy until the medications wore off, not that he was faking 
a suicide attempt. Mr. Ehrlick asserts that it is absurd to assume that he was faking a suicide 
attempt by being sleepy and denying that he had attempted suicide 
As such, the State did not prove that Mr. Ehrlick made a fake suicide attempt. Instead the 
evidence proves only that Ms. Jenkins' sister thought there was a chance Mr. Ehrlick had 
attempted suicide, although her actions show that she had little genuine concern that that was the 
case, that medical professionals did not think Mr. Ehrlick had attempted suicide, that Mr. Ehrlick 
was sleepy and grumpy, and that Mr. Ehrlick adamantly denied attempting suicide. Because the 
State failed to prove that Mr. Ehrlick faked a suicide attempt, the evidence is not relevant for any 
of the stated purposes. 
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Further, Mr. Ehrlick asserts that a fake suicide attempt could not prove the State's 
intended I.R.E. 404(b) purposes, even if that is what the evidence had actually shown. While 
Mr. Ehrlick concedes that an actual suicide attempt may show a consciousness of guilt, a fake 
suicide attempt is a cry out for attention. It is certainly not a diversionary tactic, as the effect 
would be to draw even more attention towards Mr. Ehrlick. As noted by the district court, a 
"suicide attempt is unusual behavior for an innocent person." (R., p.809.) As such, a fake 
suicide attempt simply does not show a consciousness of guilt or a plan, motive, intent, or 
common scheme to direct attention away from Mr. Ehrlick as it draws more attention to him, the 
expressly opposite reason for which the State asserts Mr. Ehrlick faked a suicide attempt. 
Therefore, the evidence of an alleged fake suicide attempt by Mr. Ehrlick was not 
admissible because the State has not proven that a fake suicide attempt occurred or that, even if it 
had occurred, it would be relevant for any of the offered purposes. 
3. The Evidence Does Not Support The Allegation In Count II 
The State argued that evidence that Mr. Ehrlick faked an attempted suicide is direct 
evidence on Count II, the charge involving the failure to report the death of R.M. (Tr., p.462, 
L.11 - p.463, L.3.) Mr. Ehrlick maintains that the State has failed to prove that there was a fake 
suicide attempt and that it was error for the district court to determine that there was an actual 
suicide attempt and, on these grounds alone, the evidence fails to meet relevancy standards. (See 
sections B(l) and B(2), supra.) 
Assuming arguendo, that Mr. Ehrlick had faked a suicide attempt, it would not provide 
direct evidence that he had failed to report R.M.' s death. Mr. Ehr lick was charged with violating 
I.C. § 19-4201A(3) which states: "Any person who, with the intent to prevent discovery of the 
manner of death, fails to notify or delays notification to the coroner or law enforcement pursuant 
to subsection (1) of this section, shall be guilty of a felony ... " Id. The alleged fake suicide 
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attempt occurred one week after R.M. was reported missing. If, Mr. Ehrlick had kno\vn about the 
death of R.M., he presumably would have known for over a week and would have been guilty of 
this charge prior to the alleged fake attempted suicide. The presentation of this evidence does not 
strengthen the State's case on this count. 
Additionally, Mr. Ehrlick was awake and eating a meal within a few hours of being 
admitted into the hospital. (S.R., pp.678-679.) Therefore, the alleged fake suicide attempt and 
the time taken to treat Mr. Ehrlick account for only a few hours. Mr. Ehrlick never admitted to 
killing R.M. or having any knowledge of R.M.'s death and, as a result, never made any report to 
police regarding R.M.'s body. The State was allowed to present numerous police interviews of 
Mr. Ehrlick, including conversations that occurred after the alleged fake suicide attempt. The 
State can easily show that Mr. Ehr lick never reported R.M. 's death to the coroner or law 
enforcement. Therefore, presentation of the alleged fake suicide attempt does not directly prove 
that Mr. Ehr lick failed to or delayed in reporting R.M.' s death as an explanation of what 
occurred during these few limited hours it is not necessary to prove that Mr. Ehrlick was guilty 
of Count II. 
To the extent that the State asserts the evidence is relevant because police believed that 
Mr. Ehrlick was going to make a different statement to police on the same morning as the alleged 
fake suicide and this was an action to avoid making such a statement, Mr. Ehrlick also asserts the 
fake suicide attempt is not relevant for this purpose. First, one can only speculate as to what 
Mr. Ehrlick may have told officers had he spoke with them that day. Second, due to the fact that 
Mr. Ehrlick never reported R.M.'s death, one can not assume that it was a fake suicide that was 
the critical delay establishing guilt to Count II. And, finally, Mr. Ehrlick had no duty to speak to 
the officers on the morning of July 31, 2009. (See argument regarding the violation of 
Mr. Ehrlick's Fifth Amendment rights, infra.) 
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In summary, the evidence of the alleged fake suicide attempt does not make it more or 
less probable that Mr. Ehrlick failed to report R.M.'s death. As such, it is not relevant evidence 
and should have been excluded. 
4. If The Evidence Is Found To Be Relevant, Its Admission Violates Mr. Ehrlick's 
Fifth Amendment Rights 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself.. .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V. Parties are not entitled to draw any 
inference from a witness's invocation of the Fifth Amendment. KENNETH S. BROUN, ET AL., 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE§ 137 at 512 (John William Strong, ed., 4th ed.1992). Further, 
in a criminal case, a prosecutor may not directly or indirectly comment on a defendant's 
invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent, either at trial or before trial, for the 
purposes of inferring guilt. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
Mr. Ehrlick asserts the district court committed reversible error when it allowed the State 
to present evidence of an alleged fake suicide attempt or alleged suicide attempt because the 
evidence amounts to a violation of Mr. Ehrlick's Fifth Amendment rights. This evidence was 
designed to prejudicially persuade the jury to infer guilt from Mr. Ehrlick's failure to speak with 
police regarding the disappearance of R.M. on July 31, 2009. 
The district court found that the suicide attempt tended to show that Mr. Ehrlick knew 
facts about R.M.'s disappearance that were unknown to police and that it would exhibit 
consciousness of guilt. (R., p.810.) In the next paragraph the district court analyzed State v. 
Moore, 131 Idaho 814 (1998) acknowledging that "the evidence [of Mr. Moore's fleeing of the 
jurisdiction when he became aware of an investigation regarding suspected sexual abuse] was 
probative of the issue of flight and was admitted for that purpose and not directly as an 
admission of guilt, we hold that the district court did not err in admitting the testimony." Id. at 
821. The district court continued that the evidence is primarily admitted to show the attempted 
63 
suicide or conduct during the time he was a suspect; it also shows state of mind and his delay in 
reporting R.M.'s death. (R., p.810.) The district court ends its analysis with a question, "Was his 
conduct that of an innocent or guilty person?" (R., p.810.) 
It is clear that while the district court found the evidence admissible to show conduct, as 
was allowed in A,foore, it also found the evidence admissible to show consciousness of guilt or to 
directly infer Mr. Ehrlick's guilt from his failure to speak with officers on the date in question. 
The State was seeking to introduce evidence of the alleged suicide attempt or fake suicide 
attempt because the police believed that Mr. Ehrlick was going to "tell the truth" or tell the 
officers something different than before. (S.R., pp.415-416.) As such, the State has argued that 
the evidence is relevant to show that Mr. Ehrlick was attempting to delay or totally avoid talking 
to the police on that day. Clearly, Mr. Ehrlick has no obligation to talk to the police at all and this 
right is protected by the Fifth Amendment. Any implication that he was avoiding talking to the 
police though his actions is an attempt to have the jury improperly infer his guilt from his 
assertion of his right to remain silent. 
In Moore, the defendant asserted it was a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights for the 
district court to allow testimony that when he learned that he was being investigated for sexual 
abuse he moved to Oregon. Moore, 131 Idaho 819-21. The State Supreme Court acknowledged 
that evidence of flight is relevant to show a consciousness of guilt. Id. at 819. The Court also 
noted that evidence that Mr. Moore fled the jurisdiction when he became aware of the 
investigation, after the officer requested that Mr. Moore come and speak with him the next day, 
was admissible to show the context of the flight. Id. at 820-21. 
The case at hand is easily distinguishable. First, Mr. Ehrlick did not flee the jurisdiction. 
Instead, he was dropped off at the police station. He had been speaking with officers daily for a 
week, being asked the same questions over and over again. Further, it is important to note that 
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Mr. Ehrlick's actions did not limit his ability to speak with the officers that day. Certainly, he 
was tired and did not attempt to communicate with the officers early that morning. However, 
there is no evidence that he requested to be transported to the emergency room. It was police 
officers who told Ms. Jenkins' sister to drop Mr. Ehrlick off at the police station and the same 
officers who requested paramedics. 
Further, when Mr. Ehrlick was set to be released and became angry, it was officers who 
requested that he be held on a mental health hold. The prosecutor represented to the district court 
that it was the doctor that made the decision to have Mr. Ehrlick committed, not the police. (Tr., 
p.465, L.23 - p.466, L.6.) However, this was a misrepresentation of the facts. Dr. Barnes 
testified that "officers contacted their supervisor ... and that hold was enacted from them." 
(Tr., p.5479, Ls.8-19.) As such, Mr. Ehrlick's inability to meet with officers that day was 
entirely the result of government action and not attributable to Mr. Ehrlick's actions as in Moore. 
The evidence regarding Mr. Ehrlick's attempted suicide or attempted fake suicide was 
admitted with the core purpose of showing that he was attempting to avoid the police and avoid 
telling them "the truth" about what had happened with R.M. This is clearly a comment on his 
desire to not speak further with the police and is tantamount to a Fifth Amendment violation. As 
such, the evidence is not admissible as it violates Mr. Ehrlick's Fifth Amendment rights and the 
district court erred in allowing the evidence. 
5. The Probative Value Is Outweighed By The Prejudicial Effect 
As noted above, the evidence has little to no probative value. However, there is a danger 
of prejudice to Mr. Ehrlick because the evidence shows that he is a person who may have taken 
more of his prescription medication than he was prescribed, indicating a possible substance 
abuse issue. Mr. Ehrlick' s refusal to answer all of the questions of medical staff shows that 
Mr. Ehrlick may be a disagreeable person, again portraying him in an unfavorable light to the 
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jury. The jury should not be presented with information that puts them in a position of personally 
disliking the defendant in an already emotionally driven case, especially when such evidence has 
very limited probative value. As such, Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting evidence related to an actual or fake suicide attempt because the 
evidence's prejudicial effect outweighs any potential probative value. 
C. The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error Was Harmless 
Because the district court's erroneous ruling was preserved by a timely objection, the 
State bears the burden of proving the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Additional 
harmless error arguments and authority can be found in section I(C) and are incorporated herein 
by reference. The State cannot show the error was harmless in this case. This is especially true in 
light of the way the jury was instructed regarding the admission of all I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. 
There was no limiting instruction given contemporaneously with the testimony. Instead, only a 
single instruction was given at the close of evidence. (R., p.1212.) This instruction was very 
general and did not properly limit the ways in which the jury could consider the evidence, 
instructing on all I.R.E. 404(b) purposes not just the limited exceptions under which this 
evidence was admitted. Based upon the instruction given, it cannot be known if the jury 
considered the evidence for proper purposes or improper purposes.20 This is particularly 
dangerous in this instance due to the risk that the jury may have considered !4e testimony as 
evidence of Mr. Ehrlick's guilt because he was not talking to police (asserting his right to remain 
silent); thereby, infringing upon Mr. Ehrlick's Fifth Amendment rights. As such, the State cannot 
show the error was harmless. 
20 Mr. Ehrlick does not raise the failure to properly instruct the jury as a separate issue as there was no objection to 
the improper jury instruction. However, he asserts that the improper instruction can be considered in evaluating the 
harm of the erroneous admission of the testimony regardless of the failure by defense counsel to object. 
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VI. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing Samantha Burnett To Testify That Others 
Told Her That They Had Not Heard Of A Birthday Party And That, In Her Lay Opinion, The 
Story OfR.M. Going To A Birthday Party Did Not Make Sense To Her 
A. Relevant Factual Information 
Samantha Burnett testified that she lived in the complex with her three children. 
(Tr., p.3490, L.12 - p.3491, L.19.) She testified that she was with her children at the pool from 
between around 8 or 8:30 until closing time at 10:00 p.m., and that she did not see R.M. 
(Tr., p.3494, L.19 - p.3495, L.22.) When she and her children came home from the pool, she 
heard people looking for RM. and she joined in the search, speaking with neighbors while doing 
so. (Tr., p.3495, L.23 - p.3498, L.9.) She had heard talk of a birthday party but did not see any 
signs of one. (Tr., p.3498, Ls.10-22.) Stating that if you want to know what is going on in the 
complex, you talk to the kids, Ms. Burnett testified that she spoke with at least 15 or 20 kids. 
(Tr., p.3498, L.23 - p.3499, L.22.) The prosecutor asked her, "And during the time that you 
were out searching, did you come across anybody who knew anything about a birthday party?" 
(Tr., p.3499, Ls.23-15.) Defense counsel objected based both upon hearsay and upon leading 
grounds.21 (Tr., p.3950, Ls.1-2.) The district court overruled the objection and Ms. Burnett 
testified that she did not find anyone who knew anything about a birthday party. (Tr., p.3500, 
Ls.8-12.) 
Idaho appellate Courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a lower 
court's decision to either admit or exclude evidence. Almaraz at 5 (quoting White, 140 Idaho at 
888.) '"Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial 
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted," and is generally not 
21 Mr. Ehrlick does not assert the district court erred in overruling the objection based upon "leading." 
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admissible absent an exception provided by other rules of evidence. I.R.E. 801(c), 802. "A 
'statement' is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is 
intended by the person as an assertion." I.R.E. 801(a). 
While the State did not ask Ms. Burnett to reveal any particular statement made by any 
particular declarant, Ms. Burnett's testimony still constituted hearsay. The term "statement" is 
defined as an "oral or written assertion." Kids providing information as to the existence or non-
existence of a birthday party is an "assetiion." I.R.E. 80l(a). Furthermore, the State offered 
these statements to "prove the truth of the matter asserted," i.e., that there was no birthday party. 
I.R.E. 801(c). The State did not argue that it was offering the testimony for any other reason; 
rather, the State simply relied upon its belief that not soliciting a specific statement from a 
specific person, is not hearsay. (Tr., p.3500, Ls.3-5.) The district court abused its discretion by 
allowing Ms. Burnett to testify that she did not find anyone who knew anything about a birthday 
party. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing Ms. Burnett To Testify That The 
Story She Heard About R.M. Going To A Birthday Party Did Not Make Sense To Her 
The district court compounded its error in allowing Ms. Burnett to testify that the kids in 
the complex relayed to her that they did not hear about a birthday party, by allowing Ms. Burnett 
to rely upon this hearsay to provide an opinion that this story did not make sense to her. After 
testifying that she did not come across anybody who knew about the birthday party, the 
prosecutor asked Ms. Burnett, "At the time that you heard this, did you personally question the 
birthday party story?" (Tr., p.3500, Ls.13-15.) Defense counsel objected on relevance grounds 
and a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury. (Tr., p.3500, L.16 - p.3505, L.17.) 
During the hearing, defense counsel argued that Ms. Burnett should not be allowed to 
give an opinion on the matter, as her opinion is irrelevant and "runs a foul (sic) of the very 
prescription that says that the jury should be given competent, relevant evidence, and I don't 
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think we should be allowed to have an opinion of this nature." (Tr., p.3501, L.20 - p.3502, 
L.20.) The State countered by arguing that I.R.E. 701 allows such evidence and "the question of 
whether there's a birthday party and the nature of the birthday party story is absolutely relevant 
because Mr. Ehrlick's claim from the first day that he met with officers was that [R.M.] was 
going to a birthday party." (Tr., p.3502, L.22 - p.3504, L.7.) The State argued that it believed 
Ms. Burnett's statement would be given based upon her own perception, and that her testimony 
"goes to the credibility of the story that Mr. Ehrlick was telling from day one." Id. After 
Ms. Burnett informed the court that she had lived in the complex for 6 months, the court 
overruled the objection. (Tr., p.3505, Ls.9-17.) 
Once the jury returned, Ms. Burnett was asked, "Based on the information that you 
received that night, did the story that you were hearing about the child going to a birthday party 
make sense to you?" and she replied, "No, it did not." (Tr., p.3506, Ls.5-9.) She was asked 
"Why not?" Ms. Burnett testified, "It was 10 o'clock at night. There were no signs of a birthday 
party. I know with so many kids in that neighborhood, and none of them knew anything about a 
birthday party." (Tr., p.3506, Ls.10-16.) Defense counsel objected "to the last part as being 
nonresponsive," but the district court overruled the objection because the court found that 
Ms. Burnett was simply explaining her reasons. (Tr., p.3506, Ls.15-20.) 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 701 reads as follows: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the testimony of the witness in the 
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are 
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in 
issue, and ( c) not based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge 
within the scope of Rule 702. 
I.R.E. 701. Unlike a duly qualified expert, a lay witness may not provide an opinion which is 
based upon otherwise inadmissible evidence such as hearsay. See I.R.E. 701, 702, 703; State v. 
Watkins, 148 Idaho 418 (2009); State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 858 (Ct. App. 1991). Neither a 
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lay witness nor an expert witness may testify to the credibility of another witness. See Almaraz, 
supra; State v. Jackson, 151 Idaho 376, 380 (Ct. App. 2011). Ms. Burnett's testimony was 
inadmissible under 1.R.E. 701 for multiple reasons. First, her opinion that the birthday party story 
did not make sense to her, was not helpful to the determination of any fact in issue. Whether or 
not there was a birthday party is, in and of itself, irrelevant. Mr. Ehrlick never claimed that he 
verified that there was a birthday party prior to R.M. going missing; rather, he repeatedly told 
officers, and testified himself, that R.M. asked him if he could go to a birthday party (See 
generally, Ex., pp.68-69 (transcript of Mr. Ehrlick's call to 911); Ex., pp.73-110 (Officer 
Schloegel 's audio recorded July 24, 2009 at the complex); Ex., pp.131-168 (Mr. Ehrlick's 
interview with detectives on July 25, 2009); Ex., pp.170-224 (Mr. Ehrlick and Ms. Jenkins' 
interview with law enforcement on July 26, 2009); Ex. pp.238-467 (Mr. Ehrlick's interviews 
with law enforcement on July 30, 2009); Ex., pp.474-529 (Mr. Ehrlick's interview with law 
enforcement on August 9, 2009); Tr., p.5882, L.22 - p.6145, L.1 (Mr. Ehrlick's testimony).) 
Whether or not Ms. Burnett believed there was a birthday party was not helpful to the jury in 
deciding whether or not R.M. believed there was a birthday party and whether or not he asked 
Mr. Ehr lick if he could attend. 
Additionally, the testimony was inadmissible because the State offered the evidence as a 
comment on Mr. Ehrlick's credibility. The prosecutor asserted that "whether there's a birthday 
party and the nature of the birthday party story is absolutely relevant" and "I think it goes to the 
credibility of the story that Mr. Ehrlick was telling from day one." (Tr., p.3502, L.22 - p.3504, 
L.4.) Ms. Burnett's testimony was, in essence, a statement that Mr. Ehrlick's claim that R.M. 
asked him to go to a birthday party was not credible. Lay witnesses (like expert witnesses) are 
not allowed to testify as to whether or not they believe another witness. State v. Jackson, 151 
Idaho 376, 380 (Ct. App. 2011). Because Ms. Burnett's testimony on the subject of the existence 
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of a birthday party was not helpful to the jury in determining an issue of fact, and because her 
opinion of Mr. Ehrlick's credibility is not admissible, the district court abused its discretion by 
overruling the defense objection and admitting the evidence. 
Finally, Ms. Burnett did not base her opinion solely on her own perceptions; rather, she 
based her opinion on the hearsay statements of the 15 to 20 kids and any other adults she spoke 
with. (Tr., p.3506, Ls.10-20.) Ms. Burnett testified that she concluded that the birthday party 
story did not make sense to her because "It was 10 o'clock at night. There were no signs of a 
birthday party. I know with so many kids in that neighborhood, and none of them knew 
anything about a birthday party." Id. ( emphasis added.) While the fact that it was 10:00 p.m. 
and she saw no signs a party are things she herself perceived, her understanding that none of the 
kids knew anything about a birthday party could have come only from the kids themselves, i.e., 
from inadmissible hearsay. Lay witness testimony, unlike expert testimony, cannot be based 
upon evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible. See I.R.E. 701, 702, 703; State v. Watkins, 
148 Idaho 418 (2009); State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 858 (Ct. App. 1991). Because the 
hearsay that Ms. Burnett was basing her opinion on was not, in and of itself admissible, her 
opinion was not admissible. Thus, the district court abused its discretion by allowing Ms. Burnett 
to opine as to the existence of a birthday party. 
C. The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error Is Harmless 
Because the district court's erroneous ruling was preserved by a timely objection, the 
State bears the burden of proving the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Additional 
harmless error arguments and authority can be found in section I(C) and are incorporated herein 
by reference. The State made proving the non-existence of a birthday party, a central argument in 
their case. They argued in closing that Mr. Ehrlick made up the birthday party story in order to 
divert the attention of the police away from him, and that the jury knew this was true because 
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nobody found a birthday party. (Tr., p.6255, L.14 - p.6256, L.14.) The State further argued, 
Other times he says, "All these people knew about a birthday party. Well, we've 
heard of three birthday parties. A bunch of different kids told us of different 
parties." The reality is nobody had heard about a birthday party story. Nobody 
knew about a birthday party. He's lying when he says lots of people did. 
(Tr., p.6261, Ls.9-15.) Ms. Burnett's testimony amounted to inadmissible lay witness opinion 
testimony, based upon inadmissible hearsay, that Mr. Ehrlick was not credible. 
In addition to proving that R.M. was seen not alive and well out in the complex on July 
24t\ the State sought to prove that Mr. Ehrlick and Ms. Jenkins made up the birthday party story 
in an attempt to divert law enforcement attention away from them. If, in fact, children were 
discussing a birthday party in the pool area during the evening of the 24th, Mr. Ehrlick's claims 
that R.M. asked him to attend the party becomes more likely. This in turn makes Mr. Ehrlick's 
claim that R.M. was alive and well on the 24th, a fact that if believed by the jury devastates the 
State's weak and circumstantial case, more likely as well. The only reason to solicit 
Ms. Burnett's opinion that there was no birthday party, was to challenge Mr. Ehrlick's 
statements that R.M. was alive and well and asked if he could attend one. The State cannot show 
the error was harmless in this case. 
VII. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Ehrlick's Request To Question 
Detective Brechweld As To Whether K.D. Told Him That There Was Talk Of A Birthday Party 
On July 24th As The Statement Was Not Offered For The Truth Of The Matter Asserted; Rather, 
The Statement Was Offered To Rebut The State's Theory That Mr. Ehrlick And Ms. Jenkins 
Made Up The Birthday Party Story 
A. Relevant Factual Information 
Detective Brechweld testified that he was called out to the complex on Saturday, 
July 25th, and was assigned as a liaison officer, i.e., he would keep Mr. Ehrlick and Ms. Jenkins 
informed of what was happening in the investigation while also gathering information to be used 
in the investigation. (Tr., p.4786, L.13 - p.4798, L. l) On cross-examination, counsel for 
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Mr. Ehrlick asked him if he had spoken with a child who had seen R.M. and the State objected 
on hearsay grounds. (Tr., p.4895, L.20 - p.4896, L. l .) Defense counsel argued that the evidence 
was relevant to rebut the State's basic premise that Mr. Ehrlick had been giving law enforcement 
false information. (Tr., p.4896, Ls.2-8.) The State argued that the evidence was still inadmissible 
while acknowledging that they were in fact attempting to prove that Mr. Ehrlick and Ms. Jenkins 
were working together to try to provide bogus leads and misdirect the investigation. (Tr., p.4896, 
Ls.9-22.) The court decided to take the matter up outside the presence of the jury at a later point. 
(Tr., p.4896, L.23 - p.4897, L.5.) 
Outside the presence of the jury, counsel for Mr. Ehrlick made an offer of proof that was 
mostly focused on presenting testimony that two children, D.T. and K.D., played with R.M. 
sometime around when he went missing and that K.D. also told him she was in the pool and 
when R.M. was in the area and "that there was talk of a birthday party." (Tr., p.4907, L.17 -
p.4908, L.8.) Mr. Ehrlick's counsel further asserted that these statements either impeach or rebut 
the inference that Mr. Ehrlick and Ms. Jenkins had made up this information and that it was not 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted. (Tr., p.4908, Ls.9-23.) Counsel for Mr. Ehrlick noted 
that three officers testified that Mr. Ehrlick was the only person who gave them information 
about a birthday party and there was an inference that this was false because they could not find 
a party - the testimony was offered not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to demonstrate 
that information about a birthday party came from sources in addition to Mr. Ehrlick, and 
counsel noted that a limiting instruction would be appropriate. (Tr., p.4908, L.24-p.4911, L.20.) 
The district court sustained the State's objection finding that the evidence would confuse the jury 
and that the statements are hearsay. (Tr., p.4924, Ls.6-16.) 
B. The Court Erred In Excluding The Evidence 
Mr. Elu·lick asserts that the district court abused its discretion by sustaining the State's 
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objection to Detective Brechweld testifying that K.D. told him that there was talk of a birthday 
party. The evidence is relevant to an issue raised by the State, i.e., the information rebuts the 
State's assertion that Mr. Ehrlick was the sole source of information about there being talk of a 
birthday party. The fact at issue was not whether there was a birthday party, but rather, whether 
R.M. asked Mr. Ehrlick if he could go to a birthday party. The State contends that Mr. Ehrlick 
and Ms. Jenkins made up the birthday party story in order to divert attention away from them 
while Mr. Ehrlick contends that he told law enforcement about R.M. asking to go to a birthday 
party because it actually happened. Thus, under I.R.E. 401 and 402, the evidence was relevant. 
Additionally, the testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asse1ied; rather, it 
was offered to demonstrate that Mr. Ehrlick was not the only person who spoke about a birthday 
party. Again, the statement was not offered to show that there was a birthday party or even that 
there was talk of a birthday party at the pool; rather, the statement was offered to rebut the 
State's premise that Mr. Ehrlick was the only person who said that there was a birthday party. 
Finally, the testimony would not be confusing to the jury. The court could have given the jury an 
instruction that the evidence was not to be considered for the truth of the matter asserted but, 
rather, only to be considered as to whether anyone other than Mr. Ehrlick had informed law 
enforcement about there being talk of a birthday party. Thus, the district court abused its 
discretion by sustaining the State's objection and counsel for Mr. Ehrlick should have been 
allowed to ask Detective Brechweld whether or not K.D. had told him that there was talk of a 
birthday party. 
C. The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error Is Harmless 
Because the district court's erroneous ruling was preserved by a timely objection, the 
State bears the burden of proving the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Additional 
harmless error arguments and authority can be found in section I(C) and are incorporated herein 
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by reference. The State argued in closing that Mr. Ehrlick made up the birthday party story in 
order to divert the attention of the police away from him, and that the jury knew this was true 
because nobody found a birthday party. (Tr., p.6255, L.14 - p.6256, L.14.) The State further 
argued, 
Other times he says, "All these people knew about a birthday party. Well, we've 
heard of three birthday parties. A bunch of different kids told us of different 
parties." The reality is nobody had heard about a birthday party story. Nobody 
knew about a birthday party. He's lying when he says lots of people did. 
(Tr., p.6261, Ls.9-15.) Because Mr. Ehrlick was not allowed to present evidence from Detective 
Brechweld that he had, in fact, heard talk of a birthday party from K.D., rather than simply from 
Mr. Ehrlick, the State's argument that Mr. Ehrlick made up the birthday party story would have 
been seriously compromised. Mr. Ehrlick asserts that State will be unable to demonstrate beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the district court not allowing Mr. Ehrlick to present this evidence was 
harmless. 
VIII. 
The District Court Erred In Allowing The State To Question Mr. Ehrlick Regarding A Custody 
Agreement For R.A. And In Allowing The Custody Agreement To Be Admitted As An Exhibit, 
Although It Was Later Withdrawn By The District Court As Improperly Admitted 
A. Relevant Factual Information 
During the State's cross examination of Mr. Ehrlick, it began asking questions about 
Ms. Jenkins' daughter, R.A., and clarifying that he had watched R.A. in the summer of 2008. 
(Tr., p.6038, Ls.23-25.) The State then asked Mr. Ehrlick, "Isn't it true that in January of 2008, 
Rusty Ames, [R.A.]'s father, filed a petition with the court saying that [R.A.] was in an unsafe 
and unsatisfactory environment while Melissa was living with you?" (Tr., p.6039, Ls.7-11.) 
Mr. Ehrlick stated that he did not know. (Tr., p.6039, L.12.) Defense counsel then objected 
asserting the line of questioning did not amount to proper impeachment as the State was not 
offering information that Mr. Ehr lick did not watch R.A. at times during the summer of 2008, on 
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foundational and hearsay grounds, that the evidence was potentially 404(b) evidence that was not 
addressed pre-trial, that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial, and that the evidence was not 
relevant. (Tr., p.6040, L.15 -p.6051, L.18.) The district court held that, "I don't see a problem 
with that line of questioning. Whether or not there's a court order prohibiting him from having 
contact, I mean, he would know or not know." (Tr., p.6046, Ls.7-10.) After defense counsel's 
specific relevancy objection, the district court merely overruled the objection. (Tr., p.6051, 
Ls.12-18.) 
The State then asked Mr. Ehrlick to look at State's Exhibit 110, a certified copy of a 
temporary custody order involving R.A., and asked him to read a line from the agreement: 
"Neither party shall leave the party's minor child alone with Danny Ehrlick." (Tr., p.6051, Ls.1-
22.) Shortly thereafter, the State moved to admit State's Exhibit 110 and over continued defense 
objection, the exhibit was admitted. (Tr., p.6052, Ls.14-25.) 
Later, when the jury was no longer present, the issue was again addressed. The district 
court then acknowledged that it was concerned about admitting the exhibit because the court did 
not know if Mr. Ehrlick was aware of the custody order, because it was unknown what evidence 
supported that order, and specifically noted that it had concerns about whether it was proper to 
have admitted the exhibit. (Tr., p.6133, L. 11 - p.6134, L.5.) The court then determined that the 
exhibit would be withdrawn and not given to the jury. (Tr., p.6134, Ls.15-21.) 
B. The Custody Agreement And Related Testimony Were Irrelevant And Inadmissible 
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the district court erred in temporarily admitting the custody 
agreement and allowing related questioning because it was not relevant. The applicable 
jurisprudence on relevance determinations was articulated in section II(B) above and is not 
repeated but is incorporated herein by reference. The State did not prove that Mr. Ehrlick had 
any knowledge of the custody agreement, to which he was not a party, or knowledge that 
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watching R.A. could be a violation of the agreement. The State's questioning failed to prove that 
Mr. Ehrlick did not watch R.A. in the summer of 2008. And, as such, did not show that 
Mr. Ehrlick had lied about watching R.A. and could not be relevant to call Mr. Ehrlick's 
credibility into question and should not have been admitted. Further, Mr. Ehrlick asserts that 
whether or not R.A. was left in his custody during the summer of 2008 is not an issue of any 
consequence to the ultimate question at trial, was Mr. Ehrlick guilty of murdering R.M. or failing 
to report his death. 
To the extent that the evidence was offered to show that Mr. Ehrlick did not take good 
care of the children in 2008, the evidence simply does not prove anything related to the 
children's care. There are numerous reasons that parents limit who their children are left with 
and because no information was presented about why the requirement was put into this custody 
agreement, the jury would be forced to speculate about the reason. Any information regarding 
mistreatment of the children while they were in his care during 2008 would be I.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence which should have been addressed pre-trial. Because this evidence failed to prove that 
Mr. Ehrlick mistreated R.A. it is not relevant. 
C. The Probative Value Is Outweighed By The Prejudicial Effect 
Assuming arguendo that this Court finds the evidence was relevant, there is a great 
danger of prejudice to Mr. Ehrlick. Evidence that R.A. was not supposed to be left alone with 
Mr. Ehrlick allows the jury to speculate about the possible reasons for including this in the 
agreement. This, coupled with the prosecution's phrasing of the initial question, "Isn't it true that 
... Rusty Ames, [R.A.)'s father, filed a petition with the court saying that [R.A.] was in an 
unsafe and unsatisfactory environment while Melissa was living with you?" (Tr., p.6039, Ls. 7-
11.), leaves the jury to speculate that Mr. Ehrlick was presenting a grave danger to R.A., even 
though no evidence was presented. The prejudicial effect of such evidence is glaringly obvious. 
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As such, Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the district court abused its discretion in admitting 
evidence relating to the custody agreement because the evidence's prejudicial effect outweighs 
any potential probative value. 
D. The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Error Is Harmless 
Because the district court's erroneous ruling was preserved by a timely objection, the 
State bears the burden of proving the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Additional 
harmless error arguments and authority can be found in section I(C) and are incorporated herein 
by reference. The State cannot show the error was harmless in this case. It appears that the 
district court recognized the danger of allowing the exhibit and attempted to mitigate the danger 
of unfair prejudice by withdrawing the exhibit. However, this was not enough to cure the error 
because the jury was still allowed to consider the evidence and was not instructed to disregard 
the withdrawn exhibit. Because the jury was still allowed to consider the prejudicial language 
read during Mr. Ehrlick's testimony, the State cannot prove the error was harmless. 
IX. 
The State Violated Mr. Ehrlick's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Prosecutorial Misconduct 
"[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a requirement and a 
safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of 'due process."' Leland v. 
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution state that no person 
shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. 
amends. V. and XIV; ID. CONST. art. I, §13. Due process requires criminal trials to be 
fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial misconduct 
may so unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. 
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State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005); Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987). 
In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be of sufficient 
consequence to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. The hallmark of due 
process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the 
culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). The aim of due process 
is not the punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair 
trial to the accused. Id. 
Because Mr. Ehrlick's prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in constitutional 
principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. City of 
Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006). Trial error ordinarily will not be addressed on appeal 
unless a timely objection was made in the trial court. State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861 
(Ct. App. 2009). For alleged errors for which there was a timely objection, Mr. Ehrlick only has 
the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at which point the State has the burden of 
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. 
On appeal, Mr. Ehrlick also raises instances of un-objected to misconduct. Because these claims 
of error are raised for the first time on appeal, Mr. Ehrlick must establish that the errors are 
reviewable as "fundamental error." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court recently revisited fundamental 
error and stated that to obtain relief on appeal for fundamental error: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or obvious, without 
the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, 
including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision; 
and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's 
substantial rights, meaning (in most instances) that it must have affected the 
outcome of the trial proceedings. 
Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, on a claim of fundamental error, a defendant must first show that 
the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights," and 
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that the error "plainly exists" in that the error was plain, clear, or obvious. Id. at 228. If the 
alleged error satisfies the first two elements of the Perry test, the error is reviewable. Id. To 
obtain appellate relief, however, the defendant must further persuade the reviewing court that the 
error was not harmless, i.e., that there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
outcome of the trial. Id. at 226-228. 
A. Misconduct For Which There Was An Objection: The Prosecution Committed 
Misconduct By Encroaching Upon The Jury's Function To Make Credibility 
Determinations When It Repeatedly Referred To Mr. Ehrlick As A Liar 
Closing argument "serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of 
fact in a criminal case." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Herring v. 
New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). Its purpose "is to enlighten the jury and to help the jurors 
remember and interpret the evidence." Id. (quoting State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, 450 
(Ct. App. 1991)). "Both sides have traditionally been afforded considerable latitude in closing 
argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the 
evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom." Id. (quoting Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280). 
However, such latitude has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those implied. Id. 
In Love/ass, the prosecutor informed the jury in closing argument that Lovelass had 
committed "full-fledged perjury," that Lovelass had lied on more than one occasion, and 
everything he said to the jury was fabricated. State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 169 (Ct. App. 
1999). The Lovelass Court stated that in closing argument, "both the prosecutor and defense 
counsel are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom," and that this includes "the right to identify how, from the 
party's perspective, the evidence confirms or calls into doubt the credibility of particular 
witnesses." Id. at 168, 983 P.2d at 241 (citation omitted). However, "it is improper for a 
prosecutor to express a personal belief or opinion regarding the truth or falsity of any testimony 
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or evidence or as to the guilt of the defendant." Id. (citation omitted). The Court of Appeals held 
that the comments did not constitute fundamental error as they appeared to have fallen within the 
broad range of fair comment on the evidence rather than an expression of the prosecutor's 
personal belief, but also recognized that the prosecutor's comments were troubling and less than 
artful. Id. at 169. In State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496 (1999), even though the Idaho Supreme 
Court held that the prosecutor's statement that Hairston was a "murdering dog" did not constitute 
fundamental error, the statement was criticized as "clearly improper." Id. at 507, 988 P.2d at 
1181. The Idaho Supreme Court cautioned that, "[t]rial attorneys must avoid improper argument 
if the system is to work properly. If attorneys do not recognize improper argument and persist in 
its use, they should not be members of The ... Bar." Id. at 508 ( citing Luce v. State, 642 So.2d 4 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1994)). 
In the case at hand, the State referred to Mr. Ehrlick as a liar numerous times during 
closing arguments: "During his interviews with investigators, during this time on the witness 
stand, he tried to minimize a lot of things, and he lied about a lot of things." (Tr., p.6246, Ls.4-7) 
[T]he person with the motivations to lie and the person who you know wasn't 
truthful on the witness stand before was the defendant, Mr. Ehrlick. ... Now let's 
talk quickly about some of the lies he's been telling both the court, and, 
previously, with the investigators .... Let's talk about credibility, his credibility, 
since we're talking about the lies that this defendant has told .... Reality is he is 
the one who was dishonest during his testimony. That's relevant to credibility, 
and that's relevant to your determination of what's going on. If he has nothing to 
hide, if he's innocent of what he's accused of, why does he need to come in and 
lie? Why does he need to lie to investigators and why does he need to lie here? 
(Tr., p.6278, L.10-p.6281, L.14.) 
During the closing arguments, defense counsel objected stating that it was improper 
argument to call the defendant a liar. (Tr., p.6281, Ls.15-18.) After assuring the district court 
that it would "try to use a different word," the court allowed the State to continue. (Tr., p.6281, 
Ls.19-23.) The State then continued, "Ladies and gentlemen, you know that this defendant was 
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dishonest with you when he testified." (Tr., p.6281, L.24 - p.6282, L.1.) Defense counsel again 
objected. (Tr., p.6282, Ls.2-7.) The district court ultimately cautioned the jury that arguments 
are not evidence and that the jury was to determine credibility. (Tr., p.6282, Ls.21-25.) 
The comments by the prosecution amounted to more than a fair comment on the evidence 
or inferences to be drawn there from. Instead, they were attempts to characterize Mr. Ehrlick as 
an individual that could not be believed under any circumstances - a liar. The comments did not 
merely present conflicting evidence and ask the jury to draw its own conclusions, but told the 
jury the conclusions that they must reach because they were the conclusions the trustworthy, 
righteous prosecution had reached. 
It is a violation of Mr. Ehrlick's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial to have a jury 
reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and the law as explained 
in the jury instructions. In this case, misconduct related to the prosecution expressing opinions 
regarding Mr. Ehrlick's credibility and disparaging him to the jury interfered with the jury's 
ability to make an impartial decision, thereby interfering with Mr. Ehrlick's Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury. As such, the misconduct in this case clearly violates Mr. Ehrlick's 
unwaived constitutional rights and deprived him of his right to a fair trial. As such, this Court 
must vacate the conviction. 
B. Misconduct For Which There Was No Objection: The Prosecution Committed 
Misconduct By Arguing That Certain Actions By Mr. Ehrlick Toward R.M. Constituted 
Torture, Mischaracterizing Evidence, And Arguing Evidence For An Improper Purpose 
1. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Arguing That Certain Actions By 
Mr. Ehrlick Toward R.M. Constituted Torture Although The Evidence Did Not 
Comport With The Statutory Definition Of Torture 
Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that 
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their 
statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they 
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will give to counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, _, 71 P. 608,610 (1903). The 
prosecutor's duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent 
evidence and should avoid presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id. The 
prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id. 
as: 
In Idaho, torture is a legal term of art. Idaho Code § 18-4001 defines murder and torture 
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being including, but not limited to, a 
human embryo or fetus, with malice aforethought or the intentional application of 
torture to a human being, which results in the death of a human being. Torture is 
the intentional infliction of extreme and prolonged pain with the intent to cause 
suffering. It shall also be to1iure to inflict on a human being extreme and 
prolonged acts of brutality irrespective of proof of intent to cause suffering. The 
death of a human being caused by such torture is murder irrespective of proof of 
specific intent to kill; torture causing death shall be deemed the equivalent of 
intent to kill. 
The jury was instructed, consistently with the Idaho Code, that torture is "the intentional 
infliction of extreme and prolonged pain with the intent to cause suffering and or the infliction of 
extreme and prolonged acts of brutality." (R., p.1216.) 
During trial, the State presented the testimony of Dr. Keller, the founder and director of a 
program for survivors of torture, who provided the jury with his own, non-legal definition of 
torture, and then testified that in addition to causing physical pain, things such as intimidation, 
isolation, providing food a person does not want to eat, providing a choice of punishment, and 
taking advantage of a person's weaknesses or fears are all forms of torture. (Tr., p.5076, L.23 -
p.5161, L.24.). However, Dr. Keller recognized that his definition of torture was different than 
the definition supplied by the Idaho Code. 22 (Tr., p.5093, L.14 - p.5096, L.12.) 
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that for the prosecution to argue, relying upon Dr. Keller's testimony 
22 Mr. Ehrlick asserts that Dr. Keller's testimony should not have been admitted as it could not assist the jury 
because he was relying on a different definition of"torture." However, there was no proper objection to Dr. Keller's 
testimony so this issue is not addressed on appeal. 
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and his use of a definition of torture which was contrary to Idaho law, that Mr. Ehrlick engaged 
in torturing R.M. by making him participate in time-outs while staying in an uncomfortable 
position, sleeping in a small bed, being forced to spend time in a his bedroom, sitting in a walk-
in closet, being required to eat oatmeal and raisins, and being called names, was misconduct. In 
effect, this argument was tantamount to asking the jury to disregard the jury instruction, refuse to 
apply Idaho law, and instead find that Mr. Ehrlick's actions towards R.M. were torture because 
Dr. Keller believed such actions to be torturous. 
In its closing argument, the State argued that Mr. Ehrlick "admitted to committing acts of 
torture." (Tr., p.6224, L.19.) "We're going to start first by talking about admitting to acts of 
torture. He told detectives, and he told you, that he did a number of things to [R.M.], a number of 
things that Dr. Keller told you constitute torture ... dead-bugging." (Tr., p.6225, Ls.4-12.) The 
State referred to dead-bugging and other uncomfortable time-out positions as "torture" numerous 
times throughout closing argument. (Tr., p.6226, L.1 - p.6228, L.2, p.6238, Ls.9-20, p.6315, 
Ls.18-25, p.6319, Ls.4-16, p.6325, Ls.17-25.) Immediately after acknowledging that the State 
needed to prove the intentional application of torture to R.M., the State argued that, "We know 
that [R.M.] was tortured because Dr. Keller told you that the things that this defendant did to 
[R.M.], the dead-bug, the wall, the chair, putting him in the closet, striking him with the board, 
are classic forms of torture."23 (Tr., p.6314, Ls.3-13.) The State also argued that Mr. Ehrlick 
"tortured" R.M. by making R.M. to sit alone in a walk-in closet because R.M. did not like to be 
alone. (Tr., p.6235, L.12-p.6237, L.3, p.6318, L.12-p.6319, L.3, p.6327, Ls.7-22.) The State 
also argued that providing R.M. with a small bed or open-sided crib to sleep in and making him 
stay in a bedroom not specifically decorated for a child that was also used as a space for limited 
23 Mr. Ehrlick is not arguing that the injuries that were fatal to R.M., hitting a child with a board, causing bruising, 
and/or anything that would cause internal bruising, are not torture under the statutory definition. However, he asserts 
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storage, was torture. (Tr., p.6240, L.15 - p.6243, L. 1, p.6316, L.1 - p.6317, L. 10, p.6318, Ls.1-
11, p.6324, Ls.13-15, p.6326, Ls.2-11.) Further, the State agued that making R.M. eat oatmeal 
and raisins, his least favorite food, was "torture." (Tr., p.6237, L.4 - p.6238, L.8, p.6239, L.18 -
6240, L.14, p.6317, Ls.11-24, p.6321, Ls.10-15, p.6324, Ls.12-13, p.6327, L.23 -p.6328, L.2, 
p.6329, Ls.2-8, p.6337, L.15 - p.6338, L.10.) The State argued that Mr. Ehrlick's laughing 
while talking about making R.M. eat oatmeal was especially appalling, "he's talking about the 
torture he has inflicted on this boy he laughs." (Tr., p.6240, Ls. I 0-14.) According to the State, 
Mr. Ehrlick also "tortured" R.M. by calling him names. (Tr., p.6243, Ls.2-10, p.6315, Ls.9-17.) 
During closing, the State characterized the above actions as "torture" more than 40 times.24 
(Tr., p.6224, L.18 - p.6338, L. l 0.) 
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that time-outs, even when a child is required to stay in an 
uncomfortable position, sleeping in a small bed, being forced to spend time in a child's bedroom, 
sitting in a walk-in closet, being required to eat a socially acceptable food that a child does not 
like, and/or name calling, do not amount to torture under the Idaho definition. None of these 
actions result in extreme and prolonged pain or the infliction of extreme and prolonged acts of 
brutality. While Mr. Ehrlick certainly will concede some of the positions R.M. was required to 
stay in during time-outs were strange, uncomfortable, and do not represent best parenting 
practices, a few minutes of time-out in such positions does not fall under the required extreme 
and prolonged pain. Calling a child by a distasteful name cannot be torture under the Idaho 
Statue. It is ludicrous to ague that forcing a child to eat a socially acceptable food, in normal 
serving sizes, that the child does not like, is torture. One can only assume that every parent has 
"tortured" their child by requiring them to eat their vegetables under the State's presented torture 
that requiring R.M. to stay in a dead-bug position, without the introduction of a great deal of abdominal force is not 
torture under the definition. 
85 
definition. 
As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Tribe, "[f]or over three-quarters of a century, the 
legislature defined first degree murder to include murder by poison, by lying-in-wait, and by 
torture. No need was seen to define torture, any more than there was a need to define poison or 
ambushing, all of which are words of common knowledge and understanding." State v. Tribe, 
123 Idaho 721, 727 n. 8. (1993). Much like pornography, one knows torture when they see it (i.e. 
waterboarding, using the rack, whipping, and etc.). Mr. Ehrlick maintains that while his actions 
toward R.M. may have been objectionable, they were not torture under society's understanding 
of the word or Idaho's legal definition. 
Undoubtedly, the State knew the legal definition of torture in Idaho. The State's effort to 
present a theme of Mr. Ehrlick's engaging in the "torture" ofR.M. by asserting that things which 
clearly do not fall under the definition of torture was blatant misconduct, regardless of the 
presentation of expert testimony that follows another, inapplicable definition. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has stated: 
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant has a 
fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury." 
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903). They should not "exert their 
skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, 
[because] generally in so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused." Id. 
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 469 (2007). 
In this case, the prosecution's assertions that Mr. Ehrlick's activities were "torture" was 
calculated to encourage the jury to reach a guilty verdict based on emotions attached to the 
concept of torture and an improper theory, rather than the facts of the case and their legal 
application to the law. This argument violated Mr. Ehrlick's rights to a fair trial and due process 
24 Mr. Ehrlick does not assert it was misconduct for the prosecution to have discussed any of the above information, 
but asserts the error was in mischaracterizing this evidence as "torture." 
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under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. As such, this misconduct directly implicates 
Mr. Ehrlick's constitutional rights and is reviewable for fundamental error. 
2. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Misstating The Evidence Presented 
At Trial 
It is a long-standing rule that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause prevents 
state governments from obtaining convictions based on a prosecutors' knowing use of false 
evidence. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). This goes not only to wholly fabricated evidence, 
such as was the prosecutor's downfall in Pate, but also to arguments which misstate the evidence 
adduced at trial. Thus, in United States v. Fearns, the Seventh Circuit ordered that the defendant 
be retried where the prosecutor had tried to bolster the credibility of one of the government's 
witnesses by telling the jury that that witness had made a prior consistent statement, but where 
no evidence had ever been offered as to that alleged prior consistent statement. Fearns, 501 F.2d 
at 488-489. The Seventh Circuit also expressed outrage that the prosecutor had attempted such a 
tactic, describing his deliberate violation of a "fundamental rule, known to every lawyer," as 
"gross misconduct." Id. at 489. Therefore, a prosecutor cannot misrepresent or mischaracterize 
the evidence during his closing arguments. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86. 
Here the State committed misconduct when it stated that Mr. Ehrlick had admitted to 
causing R.M.' s fatal injuries and to dropping his knees on R.M. The prosecution stated that 
Mr. Ehrlick "admitted to doing things, doing the very things that would cause the injuries that 
[R.M.] died from." (Tr., p.6224, Ls.20-21.) "If [R.M.] wiggled, he would get this defendant's 
knees into his abdomen ... " (Tr., p.6238, Ls.15-16.) "He's admitting to doing things that would 
cause [R.M]'s fatal injuries, specifically dropping the knees, something that you've heard about a 
lot." (Tr., p.6244, L.24 - p.6245, L.2.) "He admitted that the fatal blows took place in the 
apartment." (Tr., p.6251, Ls.5-6.) "He told us that he did those things or did things that would 
cause the injuries that [R.M.] suffered." (Tr., p.6295, Ls.13-15.) 
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Contrary to the State's argument, Mr. Ehrlick did not ever make any admissions that he 
caused R.M. 's fatal injuries, that the injuries were caused in the apartment, or that he dropped his 
knees on R.M. (Tr., p.5582, L.22 - p.6145, L.1; St. Ex. 12-4A - 12-I0A, 12-12A - 12-14A, 12-
16A, 12-20A - 12-22A (Audio Recording of Mr. Ehrlick's Interviews with police).) In fact, 
Mr. Ehrlick adamantly denied any involvement in R.M.'s death throughout the investigation and 
at trial. (Tr., p.5582, L.22-p.6145, L.l; St. Ex. 12-4A- 12-I0A, 12-12A- 12-14A, 12-16A, 12-
20A - 12-22A (Audio Recording of Mr. Ehrlick's Interviews with police).) While Mr. Ehrlick 
did admit to putting his knees on R.M., he did not ever say that he dropped his knees onto R.M., 
an action which is very different than merely placing his knees upon R.M. (Tr., p.6010, L.12 -
p.6011, L.1, p.6103, L.13 - p.6106, L.8.) Simply, there was no evidence introduced at trial to 
support the State's assertions. 
As such, the prosecutor undoubtedly misrepresented the evidence before the jury during 
closing arguments. The prosecutor's comments in this case, were calculated to encourage the 
jury to reach a guilty verdict based on an improper inference of guilt and facts which were not in 
evidence. The admission of the comments violated Mr. Ehrlick's rights to a fair trial and due 
process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
3. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Arguing Evidence For An Improper 
Purpose 
Violation of a district court order governing the presentation of evidence may constitute 
misconduct. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572 (2007). The State argued that a statement 
allegedly made by Ms. Jenkins, which was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, was 
evidence that R.M. was limping on July 24th and, thus, he would not have been out playing. The 
State twice asserted that R.M. was limping or that he suffered from an alleged ankle injury 
during closing argument stating, "We know that [R.M.] was limping." (Tr., p.6296, Ls.24-25.) 
"We know that there was an ankle injury." (Tr., p.6324, L.11.) However, there was simply no 
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evidence presented that the jury could consider in support of this assertion. 
The only statements made about R.M. limping on July 24th were those statements from 
Det. Quilter who told Mr. Ehrlick during one of the interrogations that Ms. Jenkins said that 
R.M. had an injured ankle and that he was hobbling around that day, a claim that Mr. Ehrlick 
denied. (Ex., pp.417-418.) The district court specifically admonished the jury that they could not 
consider Det. Quilter's statements about what Ms. Jenkins purportedly said for the truth of the 
matter asserted. (Tr., p.1650, L.22-p.1651, L.4; Tr., pp.11-23.) By the State's own admission, 
this is the only "evidence" that was presented about R.M. limping on July 24th as, according their 
argument, "The last verifiable credible sighting of [R.M.], July 22nd, Carol Carrillo said that she 
sees him outside." (Tr., p.6307, Ls.20-22.) Therefore, the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
improperly using information presented to the jury to provide context for Mr. Ehrlick's 
statements, as substantive evidence. 
4. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Related To Arguing That Certain Actions By 
Mr. Ehrlick Toward R.M. Constituted Torture, Mischaracterizing Evidence, And 
Arguing Evidence For An Improper Purpose, Is Reviewable As Fundamental 
Error 
First, it is a violation of Mr. Ehrlick's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial to have 
a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and the law as 
explained in the jury instructions. As such, prosecutorial misconduct, in general, directly violates 
a constitutional right. It should be noted that the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Perry that, 
"Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in 
the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that 
may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a 
fair trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. This is an implicit recognition by the Idaho Supreme Court 
that prosecutorial misconduct claims are connected to a constitutional provision. 
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In this case, the misconduct also interfered with the jury's ability to make an impartial 
decision by arguing that ce1iain actions by Mr. Ehrlick constituted torture and by clouding the 
issues through a mischaracterization of evidence and arguing evidence for an improper purpose, 
thereby interfering with Mr. Ehrlick's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The State 
violated Mr. Ehrlick's right to a jury trial when the prosecutor attempted to encroach upon the 
jury's vital and exclusive function to weigh the evidence or lack of evidence presented. "The 
right to a jury trial contained in the Sixth Amendment ... includes the right to have the jury be 
'the sole judge of the weight of the testimony."' State v. Elmore, 154 Wash. App. 885, 228 P.3d 
760 (WA 2010) (quoting State v. Lane, 125 Wash.2d 825,838 (WA 1995) (quoting Statev. 
Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 250-51 (1900)). 
The misconduct in this case not only involved Mr. Ehrlick' s state and federal 
constitutional rights to due process, but also his federal and state constitutional rights to a jury 
trial. As such, the error is reviewable for fundamental error. The error in this case plainly exists 
from the record and no additional information is necessary. Further, it cannot be a tactical 
decision on the part of the defense to have a jury reach a verdict, not based on the evidence and 
law, but based on impermissible grounds presented through misconduct. 
C. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Requires Vacation Of The Conviction 
The prosecutorial misconduct requires vacation of the conviction because it cannot be 
said that it did not affect the outcome of the trial. In the case at hand, the prosecution 
unabashedly called Mr. Ehrlick a liar, encouraging the jury to make credibility determinations 
based upon the prosecution's theory, not based upon the evidence presented. The prosecution's 
misconduct encouraged the jury to disregard the definition of torture and to consider actions that 
were clearly not torture under the Idaho definition in a highly inflammatory way and to consider 
evidence for improper purposes. The prosecutor then twisted and misrepresented evidence to 
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assert that Mr. Ehrlick had admitted his guilt; while in reality, Mr. Ehrlick had and continued to 
assert his innocence. These actions undoubtedly affected the way the jury considered the 
evidence. Furthermore, the State's entire theory is dependent upon proving that R.M. was not 
outside playing on July 24th - had there been evidence demonstrating that R.M. was limping on 
the 24th, their theory would have been more plausible. As it stood, however, the State had to 
depend on the jury considering Ms. Jenkins' alleged statements about R.M. limping for the truth 
of the matter asserted, a purpose those statements were specifically not admitted for. 
The Court should find that the misconduct denied Mr. Ehrlick his right to a fair trial 
because it cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that misconduct did not contribute to the 
verdict. In reviewing the trial as a whole, the prosecutor's improper comments, constituting 
misconduct, likely influenced the jury. 
D. Even If The Above Errors Are Harmless, The Accumulation Of The Prosecutorial 
Misconduct Amounts To Cumulative Error 
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the prosecutorial misconduct errors which occurred throughout 
his closing were not individually harmless. However, assuming arguendo that this Court finds 
that they were, the accumulation of the errors and irregularities that took place negated his right 
to a fair trial and, thus, mandate reversal and a new trial. Mr. Ehrlick asserts that if the Court 
finds that the above errors were harmless individually, the errors combined amount to cumulative 
error. "Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves, 
may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. However, a necessary predicate to the 
application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error." Perry, 150 Idaho at 230. 
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that when ruling on a motion for mistrial brought after 
an instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the district court should not limit its view of the 
misconduct to the specific isolated incident, but should also take into consideration whether or 
not the prosecutor is engaging in a pattern of misbehavior. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 70-
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71 (2011). 
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that given the multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct, it is 
likely that even if each of the instances individually did not amount to reversible error, the 
accumulation of the misconduct including calling Mr. Ehrlick a liar, arguing that certain actions 
by Mr. Ehrlick toward R.M. constituted torture, mischaracterizing evidence, and arguing 
evidence for an improper purpose, influenced the jury and deprived Mr. Ehrlick of his right to a 
fair trial. 
X. 
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Ehrlick's Fourteenth Amendment 
Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of Errors Deprived 
Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial 
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that if the Court finds that the above errors were harmless, the district 
court's errors combined amount to cumulative error. The cumulative error doctrine refers to an 
accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, 
show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due 
process. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629,635 (Ct. App. 2002). In order to find cumulative error, 
this Court must first conclude that there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and then 
conclude that these errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. Love/ass, 133 
Idaho at 171. Under that doctrine, even when individual errors are deemed harmless, an 
accumulation of such errors may deprive a defendant of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 
445, 453 (1994). However, a finding of cumulative error must be predicated upon an 
accumulation of actual errors. State v. Medina, 128 Idaho 19, 29 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Mr. Ehrlick asserts that the district court's errors in his trial amounted to actual errors 
depriving him of a fair trial. His arguments in support of this assertion are found in sections I -
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IX above, and need not be repeated, but are incorporated herein by reference. 25 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ehrlick respectfully requests that his judgments of conviction be vacated and his case 
remanded for further proceedings. 
DA TED this 1st day of July, 2013. 
JASON C. PINTLER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
25 Mr. Ehrlick does not assert that the un-objected to misconduct can be considered for purposes of this issue, but 
does assert that the objected to prosecutorial misconduct, discussed in issue IX(A) should be considered in the 
cumulative error analysis. 
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